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The Legitimating Role of Consent in International La\v 
l\Iatthe\v Lister* 
Abstract 
/lcmrdit�g !o !!kti�Y traditional accottnt.r, one imporlant difference between international 
and domeslic lmt• is that international /em• dependJ- on the mment of the re/eJ)atJt pm1ie.> (.Uates) 
in a JJ!t!Y that domestic /au' does not. In n:amt_year.s tbi.r traditional account baJ het:n attacked 
bolb by pb!losophen J·ttch m A/lett Bt�cbanatl and �y !aJ'!)'ers cmd lt:,{;al .rcbo/clrJ ;t·orkit,;g ot? 
international lmv. It is !IOJJJ J-aje to scry tbctt the l'ieJJ' that coment plcfYJ an iml)Ortant 
foundational role in intemcztional lttJJ! iJ cz contnted one, perhaps ez·en a minOJi!y p o.rition, 
czmon,g lau;·en and philo.ropben. In this paper I dejenrl a limited btit important role for actual 
con.rent in lr.;gitit!JtJ!z"J(g intemationa! law w'iJile ad!ltli coment is not necenary Ji;r justijjt!�g the 
enforcermnt �f jus cogens norm.r, at lea.rt u'ben th�y are naJToJv/y understood, much of 
international /au· is l�ft mwccomJtedfor. By drmvi1�g on a Locle.ean social contract account, I 
.rhou.1 bOJI', ,gil'eJJ the 1rczy.r that inlernational mopr:ration i_,- d!ffermt from cooperation in the 
dot;;eJ/ir Ji'JIJere, actual totJJflit iJ botb a poJrible and em appropn.aie l�gitimatin<g dei Jitt Ji;r 
l?/1/dJ oflntn7tafional law. 
:-;fur"voocl Fellow in Law and [)lulclsophy, Cniq:rsit\' of Pcnns\'1\'ania Law School ;  PhD, 
Philnsophy, C:nin:rsit\' of Penns\'kania, 2UU9; J D, Penn I ,aw, 2006. ,\n carhcr ,-ersi"n of this 
p:1pcr w:!.� pn:senrcd at a cnnfcrcncc rJn the phtli.>5< >phica ! ft.)und:ui( )ns t ;f inrcrnari< Hlal b\\. 
sponsored hy the Penn Law Institute fpr Law and Philosorlw in .\Lt\. 20!IJ .\h- thanks ru 
Fernando Tcson, l.arf\- l\la\'. Debomh l'carlsrein, Ccorge Fletcher, Claire Finkelstein, Jens Ohlin, 
ctnd 1\hrri:ts Kumm for their helpful comments at rhc conference_ .\fy thanks as \\'eli to Gill Gurke­
\\'hire. Kok-Chor Tan, and, cspeci:lik, Stephen Burbank for helpful written comments :md 
chscussiun, :1nd to the students in my seminar on tht: philosuphical foundations of international 
bw ar Penn l.aw fqr their helpful discussion of rhc paper. B<:n \lelrzer pm,,ided \'en· ,·aluable 
help wir,h the footnotes, Rem;,uning mistakes :1rc, of course, !11\' iJWn. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the striking features of international lav.:, at least as it has 
rradition::tlly been understood,1 is its consensual nature. To a large degree, 
international law, unlike domestic law, depends on the consent of those (states) 
that are goYerned by it. The extent that this is true, even as a descriptive marter, 
is disputecl,2 but that large and important parts of international law depend on 
the consent of states is clear. But the role of consent, and the e:-;tent to which it 
is applicable, remains unclear. 
In this paper 1 argue that sure consent has an important, although limited, 
role in establishing the legitimacy of some parts of international la\v. I argue that 
certain elements of international law can only be legitimate \vhen consented to 
by those governed by the la\v. Here I assume the traditional vinv that the 
primary su b jects of and actors in international law :trc states, and that, therefore, 
For a classrcal statement that has resonance with rhc view presented here (though nor in all wa\ s), 
see I :mer de V:utd, Tbe Lau> ofi\'!1/iom 17 (Liberty Fund 20U!:i) ("There is annrher kind of l:1w ut 
natiom [in :lddition to the law of narurej, which atJthors oil arb/t,;;r!·, because ir proceeds frum the 
\\'\\\ rw cunsent ot m>rions."). lmportant!Y, Vaud thot>ght tlnt cuc.tom.1r\' \llternation,tl law wa'. 
�dsu at lc�1st sornctin1es cnnsensu�tl in n:lturc. St:c id ar -;_ '7B. This pu:'irion i� noted as the 
tr�ulirloruJ one by 'Tcson, though he rejects it. See Fcrn;tndu Tcs' 1n, . -1 o/ fflkrt�r:iio!Jr:i 
Lii!l' 73 (\\'esn·icw 1998). Tcson identifred rhc consensu:rl ,.,,-w with "posJtt\·ism". but rhrs 
identttication seems obscure to me:, and not necessarY. 
Sec hcnenll\· Curtis :\. Br:cdks and :\!itu Gubti, tr'itiJdmwit�'l, Jinm !Htcm,uiuH.d c·w/om. 12\J Y-ak l. J 
(2U I 0) (forthcoming). unhne at hrtp:/ /papers,,;,;rn.com/ sol.l/p:tpcrq:(m):<bstract_id= 1523')06 
(\·isnt:d Nm· 1'). 2010) (prm·iding ;1 \Tf\' hdpful and intere:<ring cilscus"on on tlm p•>tnt). 
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state consenr 1s necessarv for large parts of internauonal law to be legitimate . ' 1n 
so doing, I defend the legitimating role of consent both from proponents of a 
strong international law, such as 1\llen Buchanan,·1 and from (relative) 
international law skeptics, such as Eric Posner and jack Goldsmith,; each of 
whom argues that consent has no significant role to play in legitimizing 
international la\v, although for quite different reasons. 
1 shall, in what follo\vs, make usc of a Lockcan social contract account to 
show why actual consent is necessary to legitimize large parts of international 
law. 1 do not attempt to give: an account of all of international law. [ shall discuss 
customan· internariunal law only to a small degree (although l think a rather 
similar account of it could be given), :11 d I will not discuss .JIIS a�gms norms, 
which arc norms binding on all states, at all. Jw co,gem norms are, obviously, of 
extreme importance, but they arc only a sm::tll part of international law. They 
han: , [ believe, a different normati\-c structure and foundation than much of 
international law, and are best dealt with separately-a task I leave for others." l 
\viii focus in particular on consent to jurisdiction before international dispute 
resolution bodies such as rbc International Court of justice (IC]). Although most 
of my d i scu� sion focuses on the ICj, a similar story could be told, [ believe, 
abuut other internanonal bodies, such as the \\!oriel Trade Organization (\X'T'O). 
For the most part, international adjudicative bodies have jurisdiction onk 
in cases where the pa rties ha\·c consented tu the court'sc jurisdiction.' This is so, 
Th:.;. 1' r11tr hcclu:-c i ukl· "-.1:1t('') ru he nJqral �l�crHs 1n rlK:ir fJWn nght, but L:rhcr ht�ClU\\L surcs 
�rc, 1:r �h)ukll.h:. r1t" !!H.li,·tdu.d:-:. :H rhe intcrnatit)n;d leveL 1 Culf1(lt defend rhi:' 
p•h[udn h ..: ·rc, l1ur ln��)t.:tr .ts tTLY :1ccounr i" pbu�!h!c, n prn.,·itk::' indirect suppun fi,r rhc d:1in1. 
\lkn Buclurun, 
).h:k I,. ( JokL;.:uirh .tnd Lnc .-\. Pu::.nt:r, T/;c L .. '>!/1/.i· /Jo'/tn:"·;-/t;th:/ l-'m' l S�l�1J.) (< )\.f('lrd 2lHl:1). 
I .Hli . th1 �t1:-::h nor , in agrccrncnr with the �Iccuunt t ,fjtt.i a�l!.,t'llf n: >nn<.;. -�Ju..·n })\ 
L:•rr\' .\h\· 1n the- r!r-..r rwu chaptcT) c1f hJs hook Cn';llt'J .·--1-�r;/nJ! ..-! __ '"<onlJr:tir(· .·l(trtJtJit _'=',.� __ 1l) 
(t �,l!nhri,l;:..:c �tll i wuuld n1nn: c:bt n1)' :lccounr, it' 1 \\'ere ru gi\'C one, in ten11" , ,( 
h\p��r.hclictl U)n�c·lH dun diH::S Y.b�:, but the C=-'�'--'nrul elt:rncnts Wqu!d be signitlctnt!�- sin1ibr it 
::;cclll" !q rn�..: rh;H fai1urc !u realize a-;wnJ ncJrn1:-; �nhl bws directly rck:\·;ult to hun1:1n 
nuke up only .t -..In:1!! r:1rt uf intl�rnational Lt\v is ;1 prqhJ<:nl In n1uch philosophical discu.""i( )n , ,t· 
tht..' :;uhilcr. / "'lull di>cu·�:-; this pninr (unhcr ln rd:uiun r{) Buch:u1an 's critiLJUt' of nJnsent acc()un.t" 
of k::-:.ni:n.uu�n 111 \\ h.H fcdln\\·:-. 
ln .Jn� [' q·•.;_T J \•:11! rd�i\:'r1 Lb(' .. Court'' ;1;.:;, ;1 �CJlr.:_·r:d it'f!11 (<'If :111 .hijud\c,tri\'l' , t::\'CI1 t!J(ILJgh rht-.. 
t"' t'lt �t-- .d\\-:1:'' :-;rricth· .H:cur;ne ·rhi:-: is d< Hie tnL·rch· fnr s:tke 1 )f re:h.hng c-:1�c. I shall u:-;c orhcr �crn1� 
\\·hen nccco:.;'�lr..,. r! • :!\'( �id cnnt�_tsl�. •n..-:. 
\ n C\.l'Cjlti� •n \11 : lw-.; )2_l'I1cral rule :triscs in ri:(· c:1sc of tht· lntern<Hi<Jn:11 Crirnln:tl ( .1 )Urt 
··I<:C""). \\·hcrt· the (.'I!Urt rn:1y ha\·c jurisdicti<n1 in ':tu:nions \\·here the Cl�e is n:f�rrc·d to rhc 
Pr� ht..'CUlt!r h': the l >.. Security Council ur :·,frer :.tn :1pprn\·cd ptelirninar�- in\'csr.ig<Hion hy rhe 
Pn�...;t�OHtJr. in 1rh \HUJti,H-J� rhc: lCL rn:n· cL1i1n )udsdictl1n1 O\'Cr l'\·t...·nr:: in ,t sr:uc rhxr ius nor 
c; ni-..crH.__-,1 ro :he iur!:.;tbct!t H1 of d1t· court. l i1 )\\.t:\'Cf, as rhc fCC' ha� iurisdlctinn ( •nly 
l 
C!!li't�'!,f! jo11mr:l rj"l!1fi'l7lti!!ona! !--till' 
for e:-:ample, for Jispures heard by the \'VTO's Dispute Resolution Body, and fur 
disputes heard b�· the lCJ. In rhe case of the IC], this consent may be specific­
consent to jurisclicrion given to rhe court ro decide a parricular matter, or a more 
general one arising from a treaty at:,rreement, giving the court jurisdiction over all 
disputes under the treaty. Final1y, consem to the jurisdiction of the lCJ may be 
broader still, when a state rarjfies rhe "Optional Ci:luse" of the ICJ, ahrreeing to 
give the courr jurisdiction over all disputes arising bet\vccn the ratifying state and 
any other state that has agreed to similar jurisdiction.'' I lowever, even in this 
broadest case the jurisdiction of the IC.J depends on the state in question having 
agreed to the jurisdiction of the court. 
This stands in marked contrast ro the siruation \Ve find in domestic courts. 
In domestic courts, the founda tion of jurisdiction traditionally was �een as based 
in po\ver, and consent was neither sought nor thought to be necessary to r.,rround 
legitimate as�ertions of jurisdiction.'" t\lrhough something akin to Locke's 
notion of "tacit" consent11 may be thought to animate ccrnin relational theories 
of jurisdiction today, the consent in question is a fiction.12 The difference 
bet\vccn these t\\,.O situations is stark, and has drawn the <lttentinn of both 
skeptics who wish to argue rhar international law is not law at all, and those \vho 
w·ish for interna tional la\v to be still stronger. The latter hold that international 
courts shuu\d have jurisdiction regardless of the consent of the countries that 
might appear before the court, and that the jurisdiction of international courts 
should apply directly to indi\·iduals \Vi thin st·,ues, ::�s opposed ro applying fir::;t 
and fu remosr ro srare actors . 11 In this paper 1 \\·ill defend the idc1 thar, at least 
fnr the must parr, rhc ju risdiction of international cnuns should depend t >n the 
con;;;cnt nf the panic·s subject to the court, at least out:;ide of the "P<..:cial are< t)f 
un.:r \·iioi.Hh1n� ,,fj!r/ ''!:�f'J;J· I11>:Tn:'. rhi� exccptic,n ru the ,t!Cilr.:Ld ruk t';1!!s •nttsit..k tll_\' rn.tin :!rcJ ''t 
i1lljUin. :),·c R<•l'!lc :)urutc ,,f the lnrcrn:ttiunal C:rimin:d Cuurr (l ull· 1�. !')')::'). :\rrs 1.1. 15. l'\: 
Doc\:,, .\/C()\:F li)_),'.!, rq)nntL·d in .l' 1l..\1 '!':! (I'!'!K). 
Sl:trurc ofrhc ltHcnuriorul Cuurr ()fJu�ticc, :\rt:; .3fl(I), (2). St) Sut !t1:;:; (i')·k�). 
;,. F(,r :1 d:t�sicd !"L1ll'!11L'IH ,)f rhis \'icw Irl l'S Ltw, sec J lulnlc·;'s upini,_,n 111 .\ f.-[)t:J!,;/t/ r .\ltJ/;:·�-. 2-L; 
ll 
:; 
L�S ')I}� '.1 i (l1Jl.7) C'TlK f(•und:uinn '>f jurisdicriun i� phys!c1l ptJ\\·cr!.l'} F!�r di:-;cu��j,,n ,,( rhi� 
\ll'\\'. c�nd the \\':1; 11 ha:;; chatl�cd <,\·cr l"itne, .sec r\nhur Ta:·!nr \·un .\khrcn. T•)rMl �•':d f>tii.I/(!·- '·/ 
.·l:t!/Jr;r/tr i.JJ J>rirat(' /tJit'!'llu'lirwu! L. ... ·u·: ./1 (.'oiJ,:tJrJralin· .\'INrjl u,/ /he /)fJ(fn!ll'· f>n;/.ri?.r, il!h:' 
[)J'dii/ ... /"J (j/C:fw:!/1()/J I)Jl(! c:::·il!...:llJ' .�·}·J/t/1/J' l U+--20 (1\Lurinu� \;ijhoff 2� !ll2). 
;)c:c thl' di,cu,,inn "t' thi' icka Jn Section 1 I and tdlo\\'ing. 
( lf cc,ur�c. a p:1rry 1n.l.y o_HlSt:nt to persona! jufi:;diction in a f,_)ruln riur '.\'Ptdd ��rht..T'.\·ist: r1<'r h:n·e 
juri�Jictt<ll1 �n·t.:r the parry, :u1d p:lrtics rnay sc.:lccr the j:..uis�licr·iun <,r- .t court :ts .! n1:1rrrr (,r· 
contrJcr. hur the�t: :He spcci:d c�sc:� th:tt do nnr dlrL·cdr hc:H on tht.: i�sla: in t..Juc:--ti(�tL 
lluch.ttun, ("r C:\:llllplc, oils for the crc:tt.ion of !1<.:\\' :ldjudic:ui,·c hndic.' .,, irh m:md·.1run 
iurisdicri{ll) 111 t:·J!'cs to{ ':it:lte SLH:ccssiun. Sec l\ud1an:tn, }11Jiitr. L<y.,itiiJJd�T· rm.l So·[�i)r'l!'nJh:!/(ift-,.1 1 ;lt 
_)_;:)_(,lJ (t:i(cd m J"'ll")ft.: -}). Tcsnn :d::\u cdb fur SLH.:h C(IUrt!'. See 'J'�.;;��n . . l f>!:i/r,_•'t;t/q o( /1!/(nh;/il)f:',Ji 
I .. m·;�r 2.:; fcir<.:d in llPfl" !). 
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jliJ cogens norms. r shall attempt to sho\v that consent of the parties is the best 
\vay to ground the legicimacy of international courts. This is irTlportant in that 
international courts cannot hope to be effecti"v·e \Vithout this legitimacy. I wiJJ do 
this by showing hmv we can make use of the social contract tradition in political 
philosophy to account for the nature of internatjonal courts, focusing 1n 
particular on an account derived from Locke. 
Before turning to the details of the Lockean account rhat I will offer, it JS 
worth considering more carefully the idea of legitimacy, and why it is important 
for international law. The question of \vhat ought to ground the jurisdiction of 
international courts is directly connected with their legitimacy. Courts purport to 
act in the name of law, and to tell actors that they must do or refrain from doing 
certain things despite the actors' will to do othcr\V·ise. As Kelsen notes, all law is 
inherently coercive in nature, and international law is no exception to this, even 
if the means by which it exercises its coercive pmver is less obvious or 
straightforward chan that in domestic law.14 But, the use of cocrciw: force b\· 
courts must be justified if it is to be distingujshcd from the type of coercive 
force exercised by bands of robbers or pinuc:s. If the force exercised by 
international courts is to be distinguished from the sort of force exercised by 
robber bands or pirates, we must find a ground for such a difference. It is my 
contention that the consent of those subjected to rhe jurisdiction of these courts 
pro,,ides the best account of this diffcrence.15 
Questions about the legitimacy of international courts arc not merely 
academic. By showing how to secure legitjmacy for international courts, \VC can 
increase support for them.1" This is important fur two reasons. First, if more 
H:H1S Kds�.:n, Pn.Htipli'J r{ fnttn:::f:>n::;/ I .t::U' 5 (RjnchJrr I t)�lJ) (po�iring th:H .11! !:1\\. i� inhcrt:nrl�· 
cocrci\T in narurc). 
There :ln.:, of Ct>tlr�t.:� \'Jriou:; nrhcr \Vays t(J rr�· ro .U1SWl:f rhis 1...\llCSt-iun. s!)llll.: fornl ot" 
urilirariotni�m ur •>thcr is u�U;llh· the most likclv candidate, ;tnd is perh••ps the dnmin:1rH C:inJrdatc 
in 1-:nglish-langu:t."c pnliucd philosophy since the rime nt" Humc's cnuc1ut: .,f l.�>ckc. t<> bL· 
discus�ed bd( 1w. �rhe t Jthcr 111�in altcrnativl- is sunlt.: ti.)rn1 t >f nH )r:il inruitionisrn (Buch:tn:ln '.:.; 
approach in J:ut.:,::-. L.r.�itima(r. ti!Jd S�'(/f)drrllJi!lat/fi!l sccrns t11 n1c tt) bt.:· an exan1ple <,f inruitionisrn 
in Rawls's sense. l:h�t.::hanan, .Ju.rt/o::. l___;;t:.iiii!Ja9·· anti St/rlJett'n;:iudiion :tr 358-60 (cited in nor�.: -t)). ! 
sh:tll not attt•mpr w ��,-e annhing like e'-en the barest dctcnsc •.>f rhe cl:um rhat :l Soci:·tl C•:>mr.rcr 
?.ppnYACh i':\ �upt:rior t\' urit\t:\ri,lnisrn or intuitioni�n\. To do ��o W<ndd C\kt: n\c t\'o f.\r at\dd ·.\nd. \ 
bdic..:\·c. would I)<J[ be in any W:.ty :Hl itnprn\'CiliCflt 011 rtnds's ;trgun1ef1t t'or the supt.::rit)fity uf the 
sncul CPntracr approach found in John Rawls .. ··l 'l'/;col)' o/)a.c•,"rc ch I �\§ ), "' (lklkn.,p rt:\'isc·d eel 
19')9). Therefore, I shall mostly assume rh:H a Social Conrr:tct :1ppruach is ar lctst a St�rim•s 
cnnrcndcr in this :m: l r:ithcr than arguing for this. \Vhilc l think bt>rh thar Rawls's \\'>.•rk is clearh· 
the m�>sr import:tnr \\'ork in moral and poliricd phil,,sophl' in rhc t\\'u1ncth centurT. :tnd rlur rhc 
social comracr ,tppru:Kh is an essential part f>f R;nds's wurk, I sh:dl n,;t opend signitic.ll1t rime un 
Ra\\·b in this p:tpcr. focusing rather on Locke, for reasons rlut I hope shall bc:cnme ck:H. 
Fnr the cLis�ic :lr,L�lll11c.:nr for rh is r)(JSitinn in rcbrinn [(I don!csric Lnt.·. :-iCi..' ·rotn T�·!t:r, //''in f>,·f!pl�' 
()/;:l' tbr> f_..t:U' 0 ·�de I t)�O). \\'c :-;hould nor :1��un1c rh:H .tr�unlcrHs fron1 t.h"-· dorn(:�ril: conrc·\.t 
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peop le (and hence more countries, we may hope) support i nternational courts, 
they \Vill be  more effective. Second, since international courts largely depend on 
the good,vi l l  of the parties to e n force their decisions, i t  is essential for the 
functioning o f  the courts that they be seen by the parties to be legitimate. I f  the 
power o f  the court is seen as legitimate, it is more likely to be respected, even by 
the losers. Therefore, it i s  an essential exercise to examine \vh at, if  anything, 
grounds the legitimacy of these courts. 17 
The idea rhat the consent o f  th e governed provides the legitimating 
fou ndation for the coercive usc of force is an old one, having firs t  taken i ts 
modern form i n  Hobbes's Leviathan. It also appeared in different forms in the 
works of Locke, Beccaria, Rousseau, and Kant, and has returned, again in 
di fferent forms, in the present works of such phi losoph ers as Rawls and David 
Gauthier . Despite obvious simi larities, a l l  of the thinkers mentioned above \Vork 
out the idea o f  a social contract whic h  grounds the lq,,ritimate use of cocrcin: 
force in somewh'lt different \vays. In this paper I will focus primarily on Locke's 
approach ,  as I belie\'e that, while ir has p roven insufficient in the case of 
domestic law, it c aptures better than any other account the situar1on that we find 
ourse lves in and the problems we face in i nternational law. \XIhile neith er Locke 
nor any of the classj cal social contract thinkers ts  attempted to apply their 
theories to international law or rel a tions to any serious degree, I shall argue that 
rran:-\fcr se,tn1!css!y r u  the: i n tt:rnatlonal conrc�r. as I \vil l  shnw in anorhcr \LlY in w h � n  f{)I!U\\''>. 
1- \o\-..TYCr, l think there is �u h:·,\':'t sorn� g()od rt::i�nn t l }  think th:t.t Tykr's b�\�:_ic �\rg\nl\cnt ·.1ppEe:s .n 
rhc inrerrurional kn: l  as we l l . 
\ly po5.�t:\''" .n\ bxre i� irnportantly '>:e·.lker than that argu�d fur hy 1-·hon\<!S Franc.k in h�s bt. J( Ik T\.' 
PoJI'ti Of I �(ilima,-y _- IJJJO!c£; ,\·a/inns (< hford I ')')U). In rh at work Franck seems to hold that the 011/r. 
or ar le:bt the � inglc n1usr in1portanr� reason \vhy stares t{) l lo\\' i n tcrn:ltif)na1 bw is that rhc�- s�:c it 
as lc'-'.-it i rnat<.:. I d  at 1 6, 21 1-2 1 ,  25-26. l t seems to me rlur t here :trt:: m�ny rc>lsnns orhcr rhan l:m·'s 
lt:gi ri m:1C1· that stares, especiallY wc�ker ones, might follow inrcrnatinnal bw, anJ that as much 
current  mrcrnariunal \:1w is,  at best, imperfcctlr le�:,.-irimarc, le.�o.,� rimaC\· cwnot c:<pb111 wh1·  i t IS 
followed o n  irs own. Bur, th is  nceJ nor push us ro the oppnsirc extreme, represented lw 
Goldsmi t h  ;ltld p,,sncr, wh ich cbims that legitimacy as such is irrelcnmr, and that the onh· t:lct.<.>t 
that needs rn he considered Is the "sel f-interest" of stares. See Goldsmith and [Josncr. T/,, Ltmii.r iJj 
fnlrn:alional l .llW :1t l (l5 (ci ted i n  note 5). Just a� in rhe domestic conrexr� hdief in the legi ti nucy o f  
t h e· Lm· i s  not the onk re:rson ,,.h,- people ohe,· the hw,  bur is sti l l :H\ impon:1nt reason, w e  h:nc 
reason tu bdiciT, I shall arg11e, rh:lt the legirim:\Cr of the law r> ;m imp< 'rrant facror in compliance: 
:lt the mtcrn;niutul level, tuu. 
Rawls sets "ur his accounr " f an imernarional social conrr:rct 1n  h i s  late bonk, Fbr { .• nr ''/ 
( I  hr•;t�rd \ 'J'JtJ). l believe ttw; is a V\try important and !argeh· misunderstnod wnrk, hur I wll\ nut 
discu�s i r  here tH �1ny length. largely because he is \Vork i ng on a different k\-c-1 of absrract i (_ ,n rhan I 
am tll rhis paper. I be l ieve th;'lt the :1ccount l will give here is C<Hnp:Htble wirh hts  accounr in t h a t  
work. 
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7 /;e L;::f!,ilimlllir�� Role of Conimt 
we can make usc of  Locke's theory to u nderstand the l egi ti m a ti ng role p layed by 
consent in the jurisdiction of i n ternational courts . 1 9  
11 .  L O C k E ' S  A C C O U N T OF ·r H E  STATE O F  N ATU R E  A N D  O F  
C o N S E N T  
l shall now o ffer a brief sketch o f  the aspects o f  Locke's account  o f  the 
social  contract that arc most relevant to the a rgument I wil l  make. I will focus o n  
Locke's accou n t  of the state o f  nature and t h e  legitimating rol e  o f  consent used 
therein.  Starting wi th Loc ke's account o f  the s tate of n ature, I d raw heavily o n  
rhe work o f  A. John Simmons. According to Simmons, Locke's s tate o f  nature i s  
moral and rela tional  i n  character. H e  defines Locke's state o f  n atu re thus: " A  i s  
i n  the state of nature with respect  to B i f  and only  i f  t\ has n o t  vol untari ly agreed 
to jo in (or is no longer a member of) a legi timate political community of which 
B i s  a mernber."2" To be i n  the state o f  nature simpliciter is to not have voluntari l y  
agreed t o  j o i n  i n  a legi ti m ate po l i ti cal community with anyone.2 1  
The firs t  important c lement o f  th is  account o f  the s tate of nature i s  that i t  
i s  rel ational .  One may be in the s tate of nature with regard to some but not 
o thers .  r\s Simmons puts the point , "Pe rsons who enter  civil society . . .  leave 
the state of nature with respect to feUc)\v c i tizens, but  remain in it with respect to 
all a Lien nations and with respect to a l l  n onc iti2ens (that is, those s ti l l  in the state 
of natu re !.rimpllcitet1) ."22 
The second aspect of th is  accoun t that is  i mportant for us is its use o f  
mor:ll concepts, in  particu lar the idea of legi timacy. This i s  already a s ignificant 
d i fference frorn l lobbes, whose accou n t  of the state of n a ture at least  arguably 
a ttempts to make do without mora l notions, defi ning the state of n ature as a 
mere (bu t ex tremely serious) lack of securi ty.2' So, whi le  it i s  common and often 
useful  to characterize Locke's notion of the s tate of nature as " . . . the s i tuation 
that agents arc in when there is no common autho ri ty O\Tr them,''24 th is is not  
. \ s  I ·dull dbcuss to sumc degree below. :1l l  , , f  t h e  cbssiol social conrr:1n thinh:rs dtd discuss 
rcLttion:-: l H.'i\\'Ccn n:Hions tn nne -;n1a!l degn:c-rhar is ,  to cl alrn th:H differl'nt nations \\-ere, in 
rchrinn i·o each t)thc:r, i n  rhe Stat�: of 0-:�nurc. 1'-ant gues further than any of the others i n  rrying ro 
�i H.:id cunrr:1ct ide;b tn intcrn:u.lonal rc:Ln ions i n  h i s  cssa�· Tmrard fJt''fXIHa! Pratt. l \vill nut 
d i�c1..1��; rhis c5�ay, bur  bclieYe thar_ n1:' :1ccount i >  :1t le:\st roughly in the spirit  o f  i r .  
,\ .  SuntTHJn:-;, L ..t):·.��r \ S!,J!t' ,\':Jllf!'t>, in Christnphcr \\'. :\l( )rris, cd, Tht' Socia/ C'oJ;/ti11"/ T�;rm:iJ!J: 
c:n-/iud r:·_iJ"ii','J ()jj l/ohl}t'_l, I ;;.}:r, and 1\m:.i.fr't�-u 97. t U_) ( RO\\'il :ln & Litdetlcld l 1)1Y)) . 
! d .  
l d  . lt  j l l.l, 
2 '  Thoma> I !ohhcs, I /1'/,:!l;mt ch 12 §j 1 -8 ( f  bckctt I 994). 
( : � )hen, Str:lt!urr·. (/!oltt. and 
(o;:trad 1'hr!J!i.xtr 1 -:L). 1 5 1  (cit('d in  nnre .2!) ) _  
!rhter 20 I I ()69 
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qui te right, as not just  any au thori ty w i l l  do.  Those under an illegitimate authority 
remain in the state o f  nature, both to each other and to those exercising the 
authori ty. One's rel ations to such authority i s  l ike one's re lati on to a "Thi e f  and a 
Robber".25 This is so even i f  submission to an i l legit imate authori ty has made 
one in  some ways better off for the time being. What makes an authori ty 
1egitimate on Locke's account wi l l  be d iscussed belmv. 
Fina l l y, it is worth noting that Locke's state of natu re is nor, l i ke Hobbes's, 
characterized as a "stare o f  \Var" of al l against  all ,  where l i fe is "poor, nasty, 
b rutish,  and shorr."26 \Vhile \var i s ,  of course, possible in the state of nature, and 
a state o f  war implies a state of nature, Locke explicitly denies that the two are 
cocxtcnsive.27 Human s  in Locke's s tate of nature arc rational and arc capable o f  
fo llowing the "bws o f  nature" even i f  they d o  not d o  s o  i n  every case. People i n  
this  s tate of nature can and do conclude at,rreements and contracts wi th each 
other, and have (moral) obligations to ful fil l  the contracts,28 as opposed to 
Hobbes' state of nature, where he holds that there can be no duty to perform 
first in a contract because one has no guaran tee that rhc other will perform.2'1 So, 
Locke's state o f  nature i s  not, like Hobbes's, one to which any government at all  
is  preferable. Rather, only a certain number o f  governments \vi l l  be  an 
improvement on the  state of  nature, and so \vi i i  garner  t h e  consent of  the  
governed. Additionally, as Simmons points out, Locke's state of nature is of 
indeterminate content-the badness of the  state of nature wil l  depend on many 
\"arious factors, and so w e  cannot kno\v for certain how bad the st::tte of nature 
wil l be \Vithout knmving these clct<ti ls . 1' > 
' 
l- l owc,·er, c\·en rhnugh the state o f  nature, on Locke's account, is not a 
sutL: of war and can be ch aracterized in various different \vays, certain 
' ' i nconveniences" \Vi i i  be found in am· state of narurc. These incl ude rhe fact 
that, e\·cn though the J a,v o f  nature i s  clear to each nl:ln in his  heart, " 'i\Ien,  being 
bi;lscd by their i nterest, . . .  a rc not apt to a l low of i t  as a bw bi nd ing to them in 
the app l ication of  i t  w their particula r cases. " 1 1  N ex t, and even more i m portan tly 
John l .ockc:: , Tu·o 7i·£·,:!irr.r rf Co:·mwM:I § 2tJ2 :H -+ 1 8- J  CJ (Cambridge 2d eel I %.1) (P. l .asktt, ed). I 
eire L< Kke lll· par.1gr:1ph number. as is cusruman·. t\ny ,:rrangc C:lpiuliz:nJ� >n, puncru:niun. iralio, 
or orhl�r cmphas i> in  a Cjuouriun from Locke arc his own. 
2<, r lobbcs. l rl'ifJ!btill a t  ch 1 3  § 9 Col '"0 (cited i n  nurc 23). 
l.ocke, / ';m Tr<'tJ!iic.r o/Cor·mwm:t § I 9 at 29t>-99 (cired in note 25). 
rei § I ·I :H 29+-9'i (impnnamh- L<>cke here S<li'S, '"ris not C::\'Cr\' Com pact tint purs an cncl ro rhe 
State of Namre between :\ len. bur onh- rhis one af.;-rccing togerher mundly rn enter into une 
Cnmmunin·. :md make one: Body Politick; orhcr Promises :md Comp:tct s .  ,\kn may m:rkc one 
wirh another. and n:c st i ll be in the Srate ot' Nature '} 
Scc.: I lnbhc:s, J._,.r:!i!bml ch !4 § I t3 :l l 8·'--85 (cited i n  notl' 23). 
S1.:l.:. Sinl'li\l )n:.;, I J}(kr ':; ,"::talt· f_'{ ,"\:at:Jrr ·,tt \ 0-� (cited �n note 20). 
J .�Jckc:. '! lru .l .rtzJ//JrJ o/(�·o1 't'!'1JIIk!1.' § 1 24 <H _V,i-\-()9 (cited in no tt: 25). 
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for our case i n  this paper, Locke c laims that, " ln the State of N ature there wants 
a kmmm and iiJ(/�jJi'rent .fu((ge, with Authority to determine all differences, according 
to the established L,aw."32 Becau se of th is, and Man's partiality noted above, 
" Passion and Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much h eat, 
i n  their mvn Cases; as wel l  as negligen ce, and unconcernedness, to make th em 
too remiss , in other l'vlens."13 This want of a common j udge, who can inte rp ret 
and apply the l:1w i m pa rtially, and who has au thority to deci de clispu tes between 
parties, is a fact common to a l l  s tates of nature, and drives reasonable peop le to 
seek to exit this state for one where they yield their right of private j udgment to 
a legitimate, authorized, judge. 
So, \Ve have seen that the lack of a common judge able to ad j udicate 
disputes with authority is one of the hallmark inconveniences o f  the state of  
nature for which we form civil society o r  government to remedy, that not just  
any imposition of pc)\ver or authori ty is a legitimate one, and that  the law is a 
coerci\'e power. \\ie may here ask which acts by a coercive power are legi timate. 
Locke gi\·es one form of the answer given by al l  social contract theorists: i t  i s  the 
consen t of the go,-crncd that makes the use of coercive power by the stare 
legitimate. 
On I ,ockc's account, we start \vi t h  the idea that hu mans are "natural lv free" 
and note that,  "to be free by nature is to have no natural political obligalioi1S:"14 So, 
by nature, humans have no political obligations, and do not gain any, Locke says, 
"ti l l  by their uwn Consents they make themselves J\lcmbers of some Pol i ti k  
Society."'" Thus, S immons argues, "only consent can remove a person from the 
sore of narure" and that Locke i s  dear that, "by 'consent' he means the actual, 
personal  cunscnt of each i ndividua l."11' The paraJigm of consen t is actual expl ic i t  
co nsent .  I .ocke sa\·� that nothing c a n  m a ke people · 'Sulvects or i.\1em/m·.r of that 
l d  c; 12'i .u .)()<) 
ld .  The thml rc·aS()!1 Ll)ckc ��v·es <lS an "incnnn:nience" of the stare of n:rtun.: for which civ i l  
:-)t l(.:iccy ( ) r  t?,• H'l:rnrncnr r� to be :1 rt:nll.:dy {:-;: rhc \\"::HlC I ){  ' 'l)ow:·r c-o hack � tnd suppurr the Sen renee 
when righr . .  1nd ru J:ir<' n due E.':mtlion." ld § 1 2(, at ..)(J'j. This is obv·ioush· :1 problem rh:u, :�t rhe 
pre�(:nr tin1L·, n1•)Si  intcrn.ttional courts Cilnnor cbinl  t� > �it.:e a \·ery s:ui sfying remed�· to. To rhar 
Jcgr\.:e. rhc c:-;r;thl ishn'lent nf c\·en :111 orhen\.·ise satisfacu:ny i n rcrnariunJ.l court rnay nc,r fully effect 
:1 "·i rhdr:.�w:�l twm rhc sure of narure on rhc l .f •cke:�n nccPunt. Hu\\·cvcr. I shall nor gn·c: much 
:nrenrinn 10 rhis cluesrion !n this p:1pcr since tu do sn wuuld t:1kc n1c t(JO f:tr frorn th\:: t.. p.lCStlon pn 
which I w:lrll rn fr,cu;;. I "·il l  rcrurn to th is  d i fticulrv nnlv- insofar ·.rs is  nccess;1ry i n  ck:.�ling wirh m1· 
main prohkrn. 
Cohen, S:r,-:urc.. Cboid. and I -"{gitima9· at 1 5.'\ (cited i n  nure 2--l) (emphasis in ori,>,..jnal). All hununs, 
c:v·cn rhns� in  the sr:>tl' uf nature, h:.J\'e mora.! obligation s- -rh"sc dictated b1· the law:; of n:nure, 
hut rhes<.: arc f1<)t pnliric:rl oblig;ltions. 
I .nckc. Tu·n ., .,,.,d/i.1r.-.r r�/C'oro1uJJt>lll ·§ 1 5  J.t 295-96 (ci rcd i n  nntc 25) 
:\ . John Sir ninon�, l)N ��/·(· l�·((f!.i' �:./ .··lllr.l'tr.�r: L..�h·kt, (�}l!.�"ol/. ""'/ /�te I .  itl/!i.r f!f .\'o1i'f'(l' 61) (Princeton 
i �9.1;. 
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Cwiii?IO!lH'Ct11!J/' except for "actually ente ring i n to it by positive Engagement, and 
e;-;press Promise a nd Compact." ;
-
Of course fe\v, if  any, people in  fact give their 
c'cxpress prom ise and compac t" to the society in which they live .  ln our O\vn 
time and place the o n lv otwious e xample of s uch cases i s  the oarbs sworn by 
newly naturaJjzed ci rizens . 's 
Locke's (a t least partial) so lution to this  problem is to o ffe r another form 
of consent-taci t  consent. Tacit coment is given when one lives i n  a coun trv, 
s ubjects one's self to its l aws, and en joys the bene tl t  of the laws, b u t  does not 
expl icit ly  consen t ro the govern men t . O bviouslv, t h e  vast maiorjt:y of those livi ng 
i n  any co unrr�· wi l l  ha\·e gi\·cn 8-t best  tacit consen t, to the exten t they can be 
thought  l"f l have given cons e n t  at a i L  Locke furthermore h olds tha t  taci t con sent 
can be withdra \vn by l eaving the country, b m  t h a t  one who h;lS given her  express 
conse n t, ' ' is perpetua l l y  and i nd i s pensably obl iged to be a nd remain u naitnabh· a 
Subject to i t, and can ne,·er be agai n in the I i bert\' o f  t h e  s tate of N at u re; u nless  
bv  a m· C:dami t)·, t h e  Co\·ernmcnt, h e  was u ndn, comes w be dissolved ." ''' As 
Si mmons poinrs out, however, t here i s  no obvious reason i n tern a l  to Locke's 
acco u n t, o r  w the nature of consent in genera l ,  t h a t  would seem to rcc1 u i rc t h a t  
express conscnr s h ( )u ld  be a s  strongly· b i nding as  rh is- l .ocke':; :Kcn u n r  \Votdcl 
seem to i m ply not i usr  that  one cann or decide to no longer support a l egi t imate 
go\·crnment, but also that  one c�1nnot emigrate and become a member o f  a 
di fferen t sc>cictv if o ne has given CH1e's e�prcss conscn t . 1" l f  e�press consent is 
especiall y b inding in chis way, i t  mu:;t be because of scnne specia l  feature o t- the 
dcc isiun m:tdc . This w d l  be looked �lt further i n  my explicit disc us�.inn of  consent 
ro the i ur isd iuion of :\ court but need r\( )t concern us further no\\·. 
,. 
l n•portanth , cunscnt lkrin:d by force cannot. _L,rfotmcl ob\ig;tt i t  > n .  ,\� Locke 
I t  rem a i n �  r 1nh· rt > be cnn�idcrcd, \l'hl:thcr l'roll!l.\c'.\, c'.Y!r! ltfd /Jy I :()ltr, w i tbout  
Righ t.  cu i  be t h uught Ct ll!Scnt. and br;Jl ' ;;ir lbry bind. To which I �ha l l  �:1\ , 
L, ,ck�..- ,  'f Ira 7 ic·,J!;:rt'.l riCo!'r'rJllll!Wl § 122 .H .)(,-; (cired in nnrc 25). 
E\ \ . .'11 I ! H::-:c ().ll h-; h:l\'C dubious lcg:1l -:- r :uh. l ing. Sc.:c [\.:ter Spiro, H<_'}Ut,·d (/!i:-::_c'liJ),,�,.,: . - Lwrn�i:': ldrn!it; 
.- !Jl,r ( ;/obt�!�;�:atiuJ  �� (l ):, ford 2iJ0B). :1nd the n:nur:tiizarion �C\.'tion in tn�- r-iper. \ I .H tht:.:\\' lj:-> rt·r. 
C'iti-zt'l1.dl!;n. ;.1t tiJ,, f,,;"'�-?/il:i:-.t: c·t.it:tr: .. :r . --.tl 0.\d l .  R�,_- 56-7 1 (f\)rthccnnin�� 2t l l < 1) .  
�-c:(· S1n:n·,pn·.:.. . ( J:r rr\· ! �:[�o: :!! · : iH,.;rd!l' ·.u '02 (cit\:d i n  n\ •te _)6). it :-,\l, )u\d h �  nP\1..: �� t i"LH t h �.:  Ltw \!'. 
Ln�J:lnLI in l .o<:ke'..: r i n1c did rH J r  .lllr .l\1." t� �r . t !.ienati 1 q1 o( citi . ..-en �hip. ·rhis  had heen dercr:nined h:· 
Sir L,k:trc! Coke: m ( Jit'l!! o.- Cu<' in l (> i !e:. (;·u!i11'.r CIS<. -: Cuke R.:purt I a . --: ]]\ .F- ( J (,! IS) , 
unl 1 1 1 c' ;tr lmp:/ / ''""'' ·uniscr.ct/ n:t t\·/rn.ttcrni tY/ -:-� J ]{ F7.hrm ;,·isncd Ucr �2. 2t i ! l ') .  ! nr 
di::-;ct.IS� l < lrl , �( ..:l' } :.1 ! /. : !bcrh ) ; c(,hcn, (�l;rrai ji'l;J.'I th( [;,'J,:dr ()llf: ]JJ/1//�f.rt;/,:{)}/ (/J,'d - lmrr.·;t_d ·.r Pah{, 
V(·i/r;:;(l;">!tY r:( (.'it:·:,.·_r.li::hl�D. in c-.\f( )l \ 1 .  �\\'�1\n.  1..:\..L [)41!1/in�:..� !J!J!Ji!_.v., r.;ti/}1} .)2 . .:.\U--L) \C:\tnbridge :�uff":") 
;1nd f{ngcr� ,\ t .  ,Stnith. (.i!'!{ · !dr-,;k· (.�;'!fF•li«�� ! ·;:,_;(J,J.r n_((�i:'i:._::·;,•_if,t�h ?'l l --.s. J -!iJ'lorr -P I-f� (Y:1k l c)tJ7). 
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the\· /;i!ld not at all; because wharsue\·er another �ets from me h\· furcc, l sri ! !  
rer:�in the Right o f, and he is obl iged presently t�) res tor�· . 1 1 
. 
:\nd, w h i le merely refus ing to i mprove another's position by jo ining \Vi rh  them 
to form a go\-ernme nt is not to harm them, since " i t  i n j ures not the Freedom CJf 
the rest; t h e y  a r e  left as they were i n  the uberty o f  the State o f  Narure,"-'2 using 
the others' weaknesses and needs to force thei r consent also cannot ground :1 
legi t imate au tho rity. As Locke says, "a ;:v!a n  can no more j us t ly make use o f  
another's necessity, to furce him to become his Vassal, by y�,· i th-holding Relief, . .  
. rh�tr1 he that has more strength can seize upon a \\·caker, master him to his 
( )bediencc, and wi th a Dagger at  his Throat o ffer him Death or Slavery ." " 
I I I. H L: :\l E ' s  C R lT I Q l' F  o r: L u c: I-.: F.  . \ 0: D S C) C: L\ f .  C o � T R :\ C:T 
T H UJ R Y  
\'C h il e  Locke'� acco u n t  of the l im its of  legitimate gc)\'(:rnrncnt, the most  
important e [emenrs of  w hich [ have set  out abm·e, had an o bvious and 
importan t impact in England, France 0x forc and Juring the t-c\·o lu tion) , and the 
, \merican Colonies, th is  in tluencc was rcLui ...-c !y  sburr - l i l'cd. David f�!ume's 
c s s a\·, "Of the O rigi nal Contract" was seen by mam' as �l dcc is i ,·c  blow to sued 
cunrracr theory, and by the early 1 9 th centurv, a t  least  i n  the L: ngl i s h -spe1king 
\\'orld, social co ntrac t theory feU out of fan H  and was suppbnted h\· ,·a rious 
fo rms o f  uti Li tarian i sm .·1·1 It  i s  m y  contention t:hat  ,,·h i le H u mc's objectiuns, 
\\·h tch ,,· i l l  be discussed nwmcntari [y, are c\e,·a� tat ing against attempts tu p rO\· i Je 
c1 l .uckean :tccount  of pol i tical legi timacy for the dumcsric �pherc, they do not 
: tpph- w rcLnions among s ta tes, :wd so pro� ide no l im i t  on o u r  : tttcmpt tt1 u s c  
[ .ockean �oci:1J CUl1 t LlCt t heory to :::tCCOUr1t for the  c o n s e nt requ i rement for the 
j u risdiction uf  international courts. 
\\'c can understand the most importan t  (at lc:ts t  tor  our pu rp< >scs) o f  
1 -Iume\ crit ic isms o f  l .ockc's acco u n t, :1s :tmount i 1 1g te> t h e  cla im t h a t  the  \·ariou� 
; ;  
.L_' 
/ .;;eke. 'lirb Ii?',.'/,:k'f q_/C-.-..r-:·J ;t///lr?l! j l K6 ;l.f � 1 0 - l l (ei re�_ I in n' 1fC: �_.:;_1. 
ld § ' ) ) .H _)-.l(-)._.�9 . .\ly ;l(Cc ,unt h�:re tlr:l\\·:-; on [, 1hen, S/rud:tn·. ():tJ!u' . .  :nr:' I �-::,iti! hl1T .\t t - r) (�..: i i:�-.:d 
ttl tl< >[C 2..J). 
l .i JCke. Tu·u Tn·atiJ�·.r ::{C ..onnuJI:'fll� § ·+2 �n l H8 (ci ted 111 norc -�·;) . I t  :-i-t.Tl l 1 "  f t ) fl H..: that \t.:hcn \\'C f11 )rc 
dH.: .;.nn of n1ural hn1 iuriuns put on Cttns-:;nr in the Luck v:Hl ; h __ ·counr. rn.ln\· , >f the ohjc::ctlon:� 
r:u�t:d tD it by Buchan:1n . 1 1Hl nrh .. :rs f.dl :1way. :lS they .lppl:·. :u 1 n 1  " ' ! .  n '  I I i }bhe:-.i . ln nt H i t 1 11:-;  , ,r· 
cnn�cnr, where cunsuH r.tkcn b�; furct::: i:-; bindin�. for c--.: :unph:. S·-·c Buch:ln:tn , j!IJtirt', I -c:_:jtill:t�,1', 
.I.'.Id J:·:�'� [ )r!!'.':�'!in<I!io!! :tt �)1.12--05 {cired in nott..' 4) f! )r r.: :'\:1!11pk:-; , , f \\'t 1rric� . . d: � J u r. �·! )!1S('n; rh:H d1 : 
nt ,r_, I h..:! H.:\ c, arisl· untkr :1 l ..ncke:u1 :tccoun t. 
Kc!..;.._-n, fur C:\;unplc. C1 )uld say in rhe 1 950" rh:n '"'( �cia! 1...' '  l 11t r.1c1 r h(·, •ri�: � wen: ,  "l t  1 11g :·tg( 1 
.ib:wdnncd in rhc tic lei < > f  tUDon:d Ia"·" ;1nd held th ; � r  t hn- s!J. ,uid :ds• , he :1handoncd in 
inrl'rn.JrioruJ Ll'.\'. Sec 1-.: cbcn. Fr;�'-·�-;�nh·J ··?/ fl!!tn.'tJ.I.IuJ ,// I �·i.'J . .  ! t  ) l () t cirn.! ;n :1 ! J 1 l'  ! -+) .  J bclit:' c h: is  
\-.·rou� , tl'l h1  ,r_h :tCCLH .. t n t �  . .ts I \\·Ill rry to shq\\· . 
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condi6ons on and accounts of consent given above cannot cohere. That i s ,  we 
cannot consiste ntly m ai ntain that government (on the domestic level-th e le\'el 
explici tly d i s cussed by both Hume and Locke) is l egitimated only by consent, 
ei ther tac i t  or explic i t; that consent is given tacitly by enjoying the frui ts and 
protec6ons o f  the la\vs; that if  one wish es to w-ithhold consent one must l ea\·e 
(in other  words, emigrate); that consent  cannot be imposed by force; and that 
taking advantage of the dire need of others is not a legitimate \vay to gain 
consent. 
H ume starts his attack with the commonplace observation that no actual 
(domestic) goyernment, e i th er up to his time or in ours . seems to be based on 
the type of consent that Locke envisioned and requi red for legi6m acy. He pms 
the poi nt, with his typical s harp wit, thus:  
But would these reasoners [i .e. followers of Locke] l ook abroad i n to rhc 
'"'orld, they wou l d  meet wi th nothing that, in the least, corresponds to their 
i deas ,  or can warrant so refined and p hilosophical a system . . . [ and] f\vjerc 
�·ou to preach ,  i n  most parts o f the world, that pol i tical  cunncxions arc 
fou nded altogether on w>lu ntary consent or a mutual promise, rhe 
magis trate wou ld soon i mprison you, as seditious, f or loosening the ties of 
obedience; if  your friend s did nor before shut  nJu up as delirious, for 
ad nncing such absurd i ties.4' 
Thi s  is  as yet a merely e mpirical argument-a c laim th a t no such 
government bas exi s ted. Th e defender o f  Locke migh t  reply, ",\11 the vvorse for 
actually existi ng governments�" I, in turn, shal l  :1rguc t h at we in fact do find a n  
example, not in domestic grwernments but in  the relations between states . But, 
before movi ng on, \VC m u s t  loo k at  Hume's deeper, mure theoretica l  ob1ccrions 
to the Lockean account.  
Having drawn arten tiun to the fac t  that few, if  any,  peop l e  could righ t ful ly  
be thought to h ave cxp l ic i tl v consented to government ,  l ! ume next  turned to the 
issue o f  tacit consent.  Ree;lll that Locke had said that tac it  con sent i s  gi\-cn by 
receiving the fruits and protec tions o f  the laws and not lca\· i ng, and that if one 
wishes to withhold consent, one must leave. To this, Hume replies: 
;.:; 
Can we serious!\' sav, that a poor peasant or art isan has a free ch< lice to 
leave his country, wh en he knows no foreign language o r  manner�, and \i\·cs 
from da\' to day, by rhc s mall w·ages which he acqui re�) \Ve nuv a s  well 
assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freelv consents to the dt >minion 
of the master; though be was carried on board whi le  asleep, and must  lc<tp 
into the oce<H1, and perish, the moment he lca\TS hcr.4(, 
Da\·id 1-lurne, 
Fund 1985). 
, \I om/. i'oMm;/, a11d 4<!5, -!(;0-.70 ( I .Jhcm· 
;r, Ic! :H 475. 
674 I ·a! I ! ,\'o. 2 
Though H ume's point ts most strongl y  made for those who arc poor, l t  
applies to many wdl-to-do peop le a s  well .  I n  o u r  day, the case i s perhaps even 
more s trong l y made than i n  Hume's, since today-even if  so meone has the 
desire and means to move to another state and by doing so would with hold 
consent from her current  s tate of residence-there i s  no guarantee that she w i l l  
find a s tate wilLing to  take h e r  in.  I n  a world where a right t o  emigrate is n o t  
matched wi th a right to imm igrate , t h e  claim that, i f  o n e  i s  not  satis fied with 
one's government, then one should leave, ri ngs hollO\v. But, i f  consent achieved 
lw taking ad,·antage of the poor and \Veak, by th reatening thetr ability to exist 
with e\·en minimal  security, cannot ground pol i ti cal obligations,  th en it seems 
that tacit crmsent cannot, at  least  in the domestic  sphere, grou nd the legi timacy 
of government.  ;\nd, without resort to tacit consent, Locke's account qui ck ly 
becomes i mplaus ib le '-Vhen applied to domes tic government. 
But, the s i tuati on i s  arguably even worse for Locke, for the prob lem which 
;m>sc wi th rcgMd ro tacit consen t seems to spil l  back f)ver ro the case of express 
conse n t. For, i f  we assume ,  like Locke, that  one must e i ther  gi\'e express consent 
or gi,ve taCit consent or leave the coun try, b u t  one cannot ka\·e the country, and 
tacit c o n s e n t  cannot grou nd legit imacy, it seems that o n l y  express ccm:;cnr is l e ft.  
So, n n e  must give express consent or else remai n  i n  the s tare o f  na ru rc, But, 
those wh o have formed a civil society a re unli ke ly to al l c)\v chose who ha\·e not 
juined rhc sncien· tu remain among chcm. This  \.vas largely the p roblem taci t 
conscnr w:ls meant to soh·e. So, it now seems that express conse n t  is obligatory. 
B u t ,  l t. c:-:press consent is t(;rced in this way, we m ay yet again doubt \\-hether i t  
c a n  be lcgi tima ttng, I n  Locke's O\Vn day, forced l oyal ty  oaths w e re common,  and 
one co u ld be subject to i m p risonment if one refused to swear. But th is is just an 
Ocl th mad�.,· under a t h reat, which, as di scussed abO\'e, Lock e  h eld tu not be 
binding, 
So, we arc now left wi th some doub t as to \vhether, in the domest ic  sph e re , 
cn·n e:-:prcss consent can be bindi ng i f  there i s  no other real alternati\'C: for most 
people ,  I t  m ight \\·ell seem l ike Locke's  theon· i s  hopeless,  and this 1 s  i n  fact h uw 
most  people, at le:1 s t  i n  the Engl i s h -speaking world , saw the s iruation wi th regard 
to Locke ;H1d the soctal contract  approach mure b road l v ,  from the early 
nineteenth ccnturv on, in the face of H ume's attack.  
ln the domes tic s phere, two n e w  forms of  sociaJ con tract theory ha\·e 
appeared, both of which attempt to a\·oid f- l um e ' s  c n t i c i s m s .  The most 
imporunr ( ) (  rhesc is Ra\v]s 's so-called "hypothetical co n trac t''  approach, gi ven 
i t s  n1ost farnou5- fornruiat1on in /I -rbc·o�y r�/Ju.rtice. [)av i d  (] authicr, i n his bnfJks 
1 fciat/Nm and 1\fora/s by A,�tet:tJJent, presented a ! iobbesian accoun r 
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based on rational c h oice t heory. �" These approaches have gain ed widespread 
in teres t, but di ffer from Locke's approach by n o t  attempting to base legitimacy 
on actual  (express or taci t) consent. \Xiith a fe\v notable  exceptions,  a Lockean 
theory has seemed to be closed off as a dead end."'8 Rawl s  put the poin t  t h u s :  
No society can, o f  course, be a scheme o f  cooperation w hich men enter 
vol untarily i n  ��  E teral sense; each person fi nds himself placed a t  birth in 
some particular position in some particular society, and the nawre of this 
posi tion materially a ffects h i s  li fe prospects. Yet a socictv satjsfri ng the 
principles of justice \1S fairness comes as close as a society can to being a 
volun tarv scheme, for it meets the princi ples \Vh ich free and ntu�ll pe!"sons 
would assent to under circumstances t hat arc fai r. l n  this sense i rs members 
arc auto nomous and the obligations they recognize scl f-imposed."'1 
The poin t h ere is m uch like  H ume's-in the domestic sp here we j us t  fi nd 
o u rselves i n  a n  exis ting society and must live i n  i t .  Leaving this society i s  n o t  
generall y a n  option, a n d  t h e  mere abstract option to leave cannot legitimate the 
use of coercive force by the state. Today we depend on �ociety in a deep \vay for 
ou r l ives and well-being. Taking part i n  i t  is not optional for us.  So, i t  m u s t  be 
j usti fied in  a special \vay. Rawls's  way to do thi s is  to say that society's main 
insti tu tions m u s t  be set up so that we could agree to them no matter what  o u r  
posit ion i s  i n  the acrual  world. Thi s  i s  the core o f  "J us r i ce as Fairness . ' '  
I V .  H U .\ ! E 'S O BJ E C T ! O :'\ S  TO L O C I...:. E Do N U T :\ P P L Y  l �  T H F  
I N T f:·: R N :\T l O N J\ 1 .  Rr·: :\ 1 . ,\ f  
contend that, when we s h i ft from the domestic �rhere t o  the 
i n ternati(mal spbere, \Ve see something quite interest ing take pbce. The need for 
gu\-crnment to regulate our imeractions,  and to make our l i \TS po � � i b l c  at al l ,  
becomes m uch less signi ficant.  \Vhile i t  would n u t  b e  wi se o r  perhaps even 
nltjonal,  it  would be possi ble fnr coun tries to a l l  l a rge!\- go their mvn ways and 
dc:1l with each other  in a m uch more l imited wa\· than we m ust do i n  domestic 
D:n id l ' .  ( ;authicr. ,\/om/.r by  . · J.�nawnt ( ( )x;; >rd 1 98(>) ; D:n·id P. G<ttttlllcr. TJ�,. 1 "'�\''" f fl'i;i!/;,m: 
l !Jr .\ far,..! tuid Politircd Tht>b�l r!l"l !tfi!Na.f f�fo/J/;�J ( ( )xfnrd l lJ69). 
See. for example. Ruben :\uzick. / !JJmdn . .  \ !aft'. t111d Utopia (lhsic I 'J74) (dcscribin,l2 \Ju�tck\ uri\ 
;\. J (  )hn Sin1n1( H1S, 'fhr L..�x.i.:rdll That�1' r!l lV� hh· ( Prin��cr-on 1 9':12) ; J\. J uhn Sin1r11ons ()n d��} 
f:r{�c t!l" .--inan�1y (Princeton \993). It is rnn d��u if Nozick n1l:<UlS tu prest:xn an :\(t\J-�ii C'< '-f'.':'ent 
account or a ln·p<Jfhencal consent accounr. Simmons clear�\' believe, that <Ktual cunscnr (nr :1 \·en 
spcci :ll furrn of tacit consent) is needed tu ground khrinmacY. Simmum, 011 th, !.J;:,, of . at 
:y,u (cited in  nure 36). His response to Humc is largelv to birc the buller ;1fld s,n· that c:sscntuih' n<;  
gu\-crnmcm nuw, and onlY a few pussibk go,·crnmcms, i s  le.L,ri timare a r  ::t!l, :md rh.tt a Lnckcan 
tht:( Jry o t- rhc sc)rt he �uppnn5 '.Vill lead u� to tht..: edgt: nf an·Jrchy, a� hi'\ ht )c }k '::\U:S,.\.:,{.:>b, �H k<LSt f.1t" 
a "ph iii ):"uphical" son. I d. \'Chile l rhink Sin1mons is �u1 in1pnnanr and inren::-;rin� i JHerprerer ( ) f 
l .ocke, I rake h is  conclusion to be a ncar rrdndiv of the I .ock;.::ln p( .1Sitlon ;lS :tppiied £ 1 ;  don1cstic 
a ffat rs. 
a t  1 2, ch 1 1 (cited in note l 
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l ife .  States do not j u::; t  fi nd themselves i n  the midst o f  certain social relations i n  
the same way th<tt people M C  born into an  already ex isti ng social world with n o  
W<lY to lean: ir . '·" ( ) f  course major and important social,  economic, and legal 
relations exi s t  bctY<:ecn \·arious states . But, the relation here bet\veen s tates i:;  
fundamentally di fferent from that of a person tO her national gon:rnmcnt. I 
contend that, before forms of i n ternational governance are established, the 
relations between :c; ca tcs arc l ike chose bet\veen indi,·iduals in  Locke 's state uf 
narure, and i n  this way are unlike those of indiv iduals born i n to sociery." ;  
I n  one ,,·ay this i s  nu t a very s urprising claim. Both Locke and  f l obbes usc 
the example of relations bct\veen states ro i l lustrate the idea of the state of 
nature. ''-' r\dditional ly ,  the idea that relati(JOS bet\vcen states are anarchic, and 
that s tates arc in  a s tate o r  nature one to each o ther, is a central clemen t  u f  
real ism, long the duminanr school i n  i nternational relations.; ' Bu t ,  musr o f  th is 
work i n  i n te rnati o n al relations has assumed that the relations bet\n:en s tates arc 
those t(nmd i n  : 1  1-- l obbcsian state o f  nature. ;4 Such a state of nature cannot, we 
are told,  be e xi ted except by the formation o f  a centralized state wi th a centr::d 
C.lr1..:· p\ t ..,-.: th!c L· �:....-�..· f., t H  Jl) r t  � this dajn1 is  with the creation of nc\\' stateY This i �  �1 c.1:-.:.:· th:n 
{_�( dd:-:.n11th :'lnd p( )�:ncr Ll:-\C �lg:l insr  con�ent ;lCCOUJl iS. Sc<.· c;old:srni th ;.lnd Pn:-:.ner, 'j" J,t' 1 ...injj';_r o/ 
[ntt ni.:ffo,h:l l .A.ni' : I t  l SlJ (ci ted ! n  note 5). 'fhe an:tJ0}0' is nut as close as \\'t: n1ig:ht iH tl rsr rh ink ,  
hnwe\-l:C � t :-.  nt.:·w "Lito..:..:. . tn.: t"t ;rrncd frnrn u!d, :1nd SIJ du n o r  t:ntt:r che \VurlJ afresh, : 1 s  dt ' pt:dpk·. 
Tilt.' l l l 1 l  r : c ·.; :ire , J t-IL' : l  ;ll_h .lnUgct)US ft \ the new sr;uc. ar least in :t tr:lns i t.ion pcriuJ . .  lnd when ,l 
n;:hr ; ( , \\:id�dL!\\' fn HTt � � Id cr nn:nitn1cnrs is  included in :1 propcr OfHion t ,f consl'nr. �l:-> I :-:h�tU 
-..hunly :trgul.· i r  ..;h lllld h <:. t h is t ihjt·ction loses rnut.:h nf irs force. 
T\: i�  bj:.:i(: pt l ln{  \Li:' llt ' th:�.:d h�· dt:" \":1rrcL C' l3ut  ir is ca:-;.y rt ) pt..·rcctvc rh:lt rh'= ci\·ic :\:'SIJ(!.HIO!l 1 �  
,-�ry r·. 1 r  r·r\ •i1 1 ! )em;� c�..tu:dl�· nccc:'S<Iry bct\\Tcn nations. a:; i r- w a s  hcnn.:en lfh.ii\·idu:\l � _ ·) ,  : tnJ b 
.. :S"'-C1H i.11 r 1  1 1-: t s  . i r t .dy :q;. ' 1n i n rcrn:t�_ional b\v. \\'c need not :lcl·cpr :dl  of his ac(ouru in Jpprl'(i:li' ... : 
t·hr· t·� � int .  :-);.·L· tk \'.ur�J l it{' Ldn f)( \.:atirms .it l :;  fcitcd in nntc ll. - . - - \ ' 
�u. ! I H l\ ilnnlc. l 1 h. k ... F:1·r, "J :rt'ati.lt.'J. :;( (;un·nu,�rwt § I H .) ;tt ··-P H�--.. i l1), [cited !n note 2�) ! ' ' j . \ J l l  
Conlrnnn\-..·L· .d t h �  :trt..· 1 n  rhc sr.l i L' � �f \::nurc o n e  with annrhcrf . ] ''): Ht ,bbc-;, L.:<ur:th.·n ch 1 .; § I �� 
\( i tcd in norc _2 _;) r ' · [ i ] n �lll Ulnc�, king�. and pcr�uns of ;--.u\·ctTign au the lnty ,  bcCIU"-t..' � - , f  rhc ir  
lndcpcndt.:tH:�-. :lrl' i n  Ct  l flt'inual jc ·,lluusJes :1nd in the � u r c  :tnd pD:->ture uf gLldutur::>; h:t\·lng their 
\\·eJp� >t1" pt ) int ing. :nlll t l 11..: 1 r  eyes tixc-d on nne annrhcr; rhat is. thl"ir forts, g:trrisc ,n:-.. an'-i guns 
upqn rhc t'ro n ! ll'Pi r1f their k 1 ngd{>rns� :tnt! ccJnrinual spi<::S up•)n r.hl'ir ncigl1bors. which i :-> a po.:.rurc 
�jf \Ltr. '') .  l ·<;r  . i  i t .,ct'ul craic.a.l cx .trninaci\Jn of the idea of rhc inrcrn�ttion:tl realm :rs .1 l lc ,/.>bcS('<HJ 
�t.Hl' f):· n.trurc. :-;ec Ch:-�rlc-s R. Beitz, ht!t'ntttlin!.'al H.dt�!!.OJJJ tiS ,, Slall" nf _"\.a!:in·. in J>uii:'::(tJ/ 7llt'O.':J' ,md 
!utrnl...:.'wnu·l !t·!�::ifJJJ,\ .1 �.-)U { Princeton I 099). 
Sc�t'. {(_ J r  �.. ·:-. .unpk:, 1 -. . l l .  (..1 rr. Ttr ·LTot(;' ) 'r'llfY ' (ir:dr. 19/9- I YJY: _·-"//! !trtmdtti.'6ilf lu tk· . \�/.'u/r tJ/ 
h·fr"r:l�:.�;r·'!,:/ IZf'llif,:,,J.'.f ! ! 2. i _;2-:13 ( �bc�ll l lan l 9()2); l kdk-�· Bul l .  Tht' .' l t:.;nl;;>al Sr�t ·:'d� : . · 1 . \ ':'!I t!:· '':· 
Ord:·r r·,: !!",;r:'(/ f 'o/:/:. -.• _: ). ... 2-� { C()lurnb!a l �f77): rKk rJ� >nnd.ly. Tu-oJ:i<'f/!-('.-nti"l Jl.,t'(t//·_,.n,. i n  Terry 
� .1nhn ;.lnd D.l\'ld R. :-.. Ltpcl. ·�·d�. l 'r:.u!i:'/r:t!.i q/ !Hi!:r?.'fii!O.'!td } �1/.Jic.f 85 ,  B6-8'7 (C:unhridgc 1 '-J()2) . 
. \ . i lh.l i n rcn.:stint-'.· exception is I ledky Bull. in hi� �lrtidc I fo/Jbr Y and tiN f,ltrnhJ!/M1::/ 
l ndli·/1 ; .  where he gi\ ·�.·-� :.;.i,l.!.nificant cunsidecniun to the idl'a th:H the SL\tt: of n:.nurc bcr\vc..:n :>.Utes 
1s L, •ck.:an 1 n  f, ·, rnl .  :Hld :nrnburco; rhis icka to Grutius. Pukndorf. :�nd de \'arr�L  See l lcdkl BulL 
}fr...-/J!N.\ u)J,/ d·r· !lllfU!to:iu J:,:/ . · Inar; br. in Cl.i.in.:· r·ink�lsrein, t :d� F-f,ji:iN.r on I .f]})' .)_)'7, 552- � _; (,\-.:.h�:!re  
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government to play the role o f  sovereign. Since such a government i s  either 
impossible or undesirable,"" it is claimed, '.Ve cannot hope to l eave the 
i n tern a tional state of natu re. 
But,  if the natural relationship between states i s  not th:1t o f  a Hobbesian 
s tate o f  nature, but  rather o f  a Lockean one, things look rather differem­
different i n  a way that is importan t  for u n derstanding the p roper role and 
function for i nternati onal governing bodies such as international courts. Recall 
t hat a Lockean s tate of nature is one where war is possible but is n ot essentially a 
state o f  \Var. Private contracts can be made and h a,·e moral,  i f not, properly 
speaking, legal force behind them, Moral obligations-the laws o f  natu re-apply 
and oblige those livi ng i n  the s tate of natu re to act  in particular ways. The 
Lockean s tate of nature is one of significant "inconveni ences" bur not 
something that m ust be left at  al l  costs,  since only some governments wil l  be 
preferable to i t. Addi tionally, and importantly, one may be in the s tare of nature 
i n  relation to some but not to others. That i s ,  the property of being i n  the s tate 
of nature is  rela6onal .  This description of the state of nature is, I hold ,  CJUitc a 
good o ne of the s ituation that s tates found themselves i n  before the advent of 
international gm·erning bodies in the twentieth cent u ry. 
O f  specia l  interest  tO us here is the fact that Hume's objections  to Locke's 
account, which were so devas tati ng to the domesti c  version of  Loc ke's theory, 
do nor seem to b;n-c much traction in the international sph ere . Recall the 
essence of Hume's cri ticisms o f  Locke. Fi rst, H umc held th at there \vas no 
actual example of a soci ety formed by consent of the governed. Second, he held 
that, given the ftrst part, Locke had to fall back on the idea of taci t  consent, but 
rhat this  was a slum s i nce people h ad no real option to lea\·e, or establ i sh 
thernsdves else\vhen.:, or to go their o'.vn way. I further argue tlnt this worry 
leaked over to actual consent, s ince i f  one needed society to s u rvive, leaving was 
not an option, and one had to consent to remain a member of society, then 
consent could not be free , and so could not be legicirnating. But none of these 
objections applies, ar leas t in the same way, to the i nternational realm. Therefore, 
s imply invoking Hume, as i s  o ften done by opponents of a consent view o f  
i n ternational obl igations, i s  n o t  s u fficient."" 
'T'hj, cLtirn f.:L)c-: back :lt kast ro l'anr. in his 1 795 essay T�JJF(Jrrl Perpt�uai Pt:Jt·r'. Sec P:tuline 
Klein.�� ) ld,  cd, 7 ;.J!Ftu·r:l PoJN'l!ial Piut a11rl otbrr IF.ritiJ��J nJJ Polilics, PeLlet' ;;nd 1-lisln!]' 6 7-7 1 ('Y':tle 2(l(l(>) 
(D:l\·id L Colclasure. trans); lrnnunud K:1nr, Pnlit;<·,,f lVn"tiJ:t;S 1 1 3- 1 4  (Cambridge 1 9 9 1 )  (H.  Reiss, 
ed). 
Sec, ti-,r example, Co!dsmith and Posner, The L.Jmit.r of !ntematiOJJa! L .. m, at ! 9tl (cited 111 note 5). 
Coldsnmh and l'usncr han: or her objections to :1 conscnr view, some of which will be discussed. 
d1rccth· or i ndirccrl,·, below. l r  i s worth noting that the\' di ffer from most opponents of a consent 
1·icw m rhat rhn· bdte\'c that there are no binding i ntcrn:ttional obligations un sta res urhcr than 
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In the i n ternational realm we have, of course, a number o f  ' 'societies" that 
arc based on the consent o f  thei r members, namely, the s tates, which have set up 
and joined the international societies in question .57 I s hall shortly look at the lCJ 
as a special case o f  this. So, Hume's first objection i s  met. And, if we ha\·e 
societies based on acrual consent, then we do not have to worry about the 
diftiCLdties found to apply ro the idea of tacit  consent .  Finally, s ince it is  perfectly 
possible for countries ro "go it alone" and not join these i n ternational societies, 
we c annot say that the choice to join them is forced, and so n o t  legitimating. 
Th is  is so even i f  certain obvious benefits will be gained only i f  a s tate joins the 
societv in question s i nce, as noted above, Locke held (right ly, I think) that 
refusal to give a benefi t  to those who h ave not joined is not to harm them, since,  
' ' the\· are left as thev were in the [jbertv of the State of N ature.";s If this is so, .· � . 
and i f  Loc ke's social contract approach to the legitimization of c oe rc ive force is  
a n  attractive one in pri nciple, then we have some reason to see if  we c a n  use i t  to 
make sense o f  some aspects of international law-particular internarjonaJ courts. 
This is not to say that just  ;:,ny act of "consent," by any state, to any 
international obligation, is binding. In our discussion of Locke's domes tic social 
contract account we have already seen several cond i tions that m u s t  be i n  p lace 
bdore consen t can gi,·c rise to political or legal obligations. The fact  chat s ta tes 
arc col lective entities that persist over time also p uts special limi ts  i n  place as to 
what sort of acts of consent can obligate the members of a society.  lt seems 
p lausible, for example, that only s tates w·h ere tbe gO\·ernrnent meets at least  
rninimum requirements for representing the popu lation can be th ough t to 
consent on the beh::d f  of the population,  at least in many cases. To the exte n t  
this i s  so, such  facto rs place a moral lim i t  on consent theory i n  addition ro the 
unes discussed abu\·e. Such factnrs can and shou ld be pm i n  place by 
international bodics:i'i But it i :;  important  not to confuse plausible limits o n  
sdf-intcrcsr� a !'  tkrcn11incd b y  c:\ch :.;ute.  But they arc r.ypical i n  their c1rckss inY( )C\t i(J !1 u f  
i lurne',; :trgltm<.:nr,; :tg.un:;r Lucke, :�nd ful tu shnw rh:H the\· :tppk a r  rhc tntc-rnariurui le,·cl .  
B uch�tnan is. rhcn:r-qrc: . ,�..-n)ng ,,-hen he says.  �1gainsr �1 cnnscnr vie\\' uf lcgitin1acy. that "rhcrc j:treJ 
no cxi�t!ng t:nric:ics ur- Jny ch:tt :Ire likely ro o 1rne :tbouc rl!�tr \viH c\·t;;r cnjl 1y the cunscnr of n1o�r uf 
their cnizcn:;, .. i f  we ukc SL:Hcs w he the members of inrernatiorul b• ,Jics. Sec Buchan:tn . ./1/jti<'<. 
[ _j:f!.ilimd�T. :ulfl Sc!j:l)rtr:rminarinn at 2-L\ (cit�d in nurc 4). This i s  unc nt" n1an:· inst :tncc� where 
uppnncnrs of cuns�nr rheurics h ;t\"C nor d• mc the needed wurk to sec if rhc ubjc-crions rhnr :�pph· 
ro :trl .tctu:1! cons:.:nt ·.I(Cr,unr �tpply ·.tt the intcrnati< ,n:tJ lcvd :lS \\·t:ll. 
l_.�_;ckc. Two Trl'ati.1·c.c t!/ (;o/ '(r1!.11h'i.'! �� t):) :H 3-+S-49 (cired in note 25) . 
Cnnsttkr, fur example, thL· rcqurrcments pur on stares tu join the Council of L:urope. l'ur a n:rc 
brief n\Trv iew < >t the rcguircments on stares in rhc: Cuuncil of Europe, see F!Jc C{)loml o( F:utvp.,: 
. · !11  Oront'll" *(, (21. 1 1 0) ,  onli ne J t  
http:/ I'' ·w·w.coe.inr/ , \ b<  Jlll{.:oe/ mcdta / tn  rcrf:tce/ pub Iicari< 1ns/ wu r_h'lrizon_t·n.pd f, (Yisi r.ed Orr 
22.  20 J ( l) .  I low represcmar.i,·c a gm·ernrnenr must be before i rs  consent is  binding o n  rhc srnrc 
(for e:-un1plc. i� l t  enuugh r1 ) h:tYe son1cth in� like [he "decent Ctln�ult:uion hier:trchy" cnYi�iPned 
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consent with attacks on the idea that consent nr:ty be legitimating at all ."" 1 shall 
discuss below several lirnirs un consent, and the ways these l imits actu:l l lv h elp 
make consent  legitimating. 
V .  i\ L< ) C l'- l ·: :\ N  l . O () K .\ T ·r l- ! E I CJ 
For Locke, recal l  that  one o f  the ddining feature s o f  the s ta te o f  nature­
one that, more than many others, ga\·c us reaso n to \Van t  to move out o f  i t-wa:; 
th e lack o f  a common j u dge with authori ty to decide disputes.6 1  If we :1re to 
ka\·e the i n ternational state o f  nature, we need bodies that  can act a s  
authori tative and impar6al j udges for sett l i ng di s putes bet\veen parties. But, i f  w e  
wan t  these courts to be l egi timate, they wil l  h a\T to be srructured i n  cert a i n  
\Vays. 1 can not h ope to  l o o k  at  CYcry aspect o f  how in ternational  courts s hould 
be set up, and do not claim that  soc i al contract th eory can answer all of these 
questions .  But, I argue that Locke's accounr gives us  a good explanation for the 
rol e  played by cons em i n  deciding the j urisdiction of courts such as the I CJ .  
\X!hi le I focus on the  I CJ  i n  what  follows, t h i s  i s  only a n  example, a n d  a s imi lar 
argume n t  could be made for many other i ntern<uional bodi es and regimes.  ;\ lam· 
of the morals l d raw have, I believe, a general application.  
I t  i s  usd'ul to conrrast the j ur isdi ct i o n  o f  the I CJ wi th the jurisdiction o f  
s tate and federal courts i n  th e LS. These courts extend their juri sdiction co 
actors who ha\·e nclt in any wav exp L ic i tly consented to the jurisdiction of the 
coun. The fact that someone has not con�cnted to the jurisdictit )n of the cou rt  is 
immaterial to the court.r'..' This i s  so even i f  the person i n  c1uestion had publici\  
hy Ra"d" l n  Fht L . :JI'' O/ _, i .�  ..--- (CHell 1n tHJtc i S) .  � 1r  i:- t·u ! !  
quc::>-tinn t c3.n :nl�\Ycr in this  p:tper. 
f,,. G<JIJsmith ctnd Posner. Sec Buch.<run, 
note .f); CJolcbrnid1 And Posner, ll.h' l .ilflfi.\ 
l:hichtH1:ln acccpr:-; <t I .t><.:kt.:::l!1 descripri1 ;n o f  the sit u;.trit Hl in \\'hich :->Gites find rhcn1seh·c� he r·, ;r.: 
the dcn::lupn1cn t  uf i n tcrn:nicn1a1 i n ;.;.ri curinns, but dues not t()l!O\\. t h n' u.L:h \Vi th ; !  f.( ;ckLl!l 
:1ccnu.nt uf h 1 >\V such i n s LittHlon� could be le�itin1�Hc:. S�..·t..· Buch:an:tn, ,:;:rJ 
[)rlrrminatim; �lt 297>-09 (cited ir'l ntHt: 4-). Sornc nt' thl:. i:. J.ue ro h\:-.;, )ncurn:.cr .. ,ppl ictiii Al ( ·,t· 
H umecln :1rgumcnrs to the inrcrnati<>nal rea lm .. Jiscusscd cthmT . .  \ nnthcr rcasun rh.l! l::luch:J:un 
n:jecrs the l .ockean SIJlur1 ( j n  that f nffer is hi:.;, I believe, i ncorrccr , · ie\\. th;H c( HlSl'nt rnuq he not 
Ul varic;u� intcrn;Hinn;tl legal bodies or :1crs, bu t ro the intern:ujon:11 leg:d s;;stcrn :1s a whole. ld : tr  
299. ) .HTJ, t'ur rea:.:ons deYcloped hy Harr, tjuire skeptical dur \\'C :\huu!tl think i l f  !n r.cn1:tUutLtl b\\ 
:t::, rnaktng up ·,1 �in�k ..... :·�.t\.:rl\ tt-ut <..:i. .\\. dd be consented t'..\ , ' 1r k·sitltn .. H(,.',J un ntb,:..r hPdUihl�., ,\':'.. .i 
\\ hole. Sec J I . L.:\. H:m, Fhc (o?!Jf'l 2.b-37 (U:chrd 2d cd 1 9')-l). I s h :dl dc,·d. ,p thh P' • l nt  
further below 
L)iffcn:nr j usti tlcltinns ha\·c been ;,.;n-cn t'nr the j u n sdict i r �n uf dnn1t:s t ic cuurcs o\ , :r r in·J('. )t:c, (( , r  
t.:x:1n1plc, the discussion in \'nn .\ k h rc n ,  d!s'd Pr..-Jt./i,·r· �/ .. .- In Pn·r,;lr 
tur :1 small ;;arnpk. Rich:tf(l Cappal\i, tn a n  
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announced, long before the cau se of action i n  consideration, that she did not 
accept the juri sdiction of the court and \Vould not appear before i t .  (\Ve might 
here imagine survivalists who do not recognize the authority of the federal 
courts.  Of course the courts do not let this s top them from making such people 
appear i f  they arc a pa rty to a case over which the court would otherwise have 
j u risdiction.) furt hermore, we do not gen eral ly think that explicit  conse nt to the 
ju risd iction of the court is necessary for the actions of the court to be 
legiti mate.(,; l f the system as a whole is at least largely legitimate, we do not 
consider i t  to be a problem that jurisdiction o f  the courts is not  based on actual 
consent.''4 To the exten t this is so, we do not fol low a Lockean approach . 
,-\ . C o n s e n t to J u ri s d i c ti o n  and the I CJ 
Ca�es may come before the ICJ in r.vo main ways, corresponding to 
c lauses one and t\H> of A rticle 36 of the Statute of the International Court o f  
J ustice. The tirst im·olves specific references o f  cases t o  t h e  court and treaty 
agreements that contai n  clauses requiring disputes to be referred to the court. 
I ! crt \\·e h a\·e :1 fai rly straight forward form of explicit  consent to jurisdiction, 
but u f  ;1  c1u i tc limi ted sort, since only spccitlc cases are re ferred under th is  clause. 
U s ual l y  \\'e can expect this sort of case not to raise many problems o f  
i n terpretat ion or appl.icarjon, although sometimes such prob l em s will arise:, a s  i n  
the  dispute as t o  wheth er the lCJ h a d  j urisdiction i n  the d ispme bet\vee n  the US 
and N i caragua, " i\ f i l i t: try ;mel Param i l i ta ry Acti\·itics ln  and :\gajn st Nicaragua" 
(rhe Nic:1 ragua case) \· i :l t he Treaty of Friendsh ip, Commerce, and Navigation of 
_l :1 nu:n ·�· :2 1 ,  ! 9 S6. This  t reJty exp l ic i tly requi red that cjjsputcs under i t  be referred 
ro the TCJ,  bur there \Vas some Jjsputc as to whether  rhe claims of N ic:1ragua 
in voked :H1\' \·iuhtion of th is  treaty. H e re the majority of the court h e ld that the  
gr.:·ner.dl�: R1(h.1rd B.  c�1pp�dli, l .o,·kr' a.i tht' 1\.�·r: . · I  l ·wjj·i;�i.!. ,ind c·uhcrr-11t 7�h(o!1' t:/ l n  Pcrson:1n: 
.+_1 Ca;,� \\ ' RL"s I .  R<:v ')7 (1 'J')2). hlr rcl>< Hl,; tliscusscd clhm·c, I do not belie\'<: thctt " 
I ,ockL':H1 account can W()rk in the dumcsric sphere, and would suggest th a t  :1 hcrtcr apprt>:lCh 
would be rn inn:stigarc \\'hich account of j urisdiction he,;r tit s  \\'tth :1 Rawbi:tn hypnrhuical 
consent Yic,,·, but I ctn n m  rlc\'t:lup this poim here. 
r\-l.:n in  CJ.:-; ... :� whl"rt :- o nh ..· one Ju(:S consent ro the jurisdictidn of :t sutc cnurr. for CX;ln1pk. \\·here 
:1 res iden t o! i )t1(· sr:ne cun1<:S to a different one to t;\kc p:ut in :\ C:l5�. C\·cn though the cnurrs of 
rhc �ccond :-.t:i [t: cuuld nnt: hJYe jurisdiction o\·cr ht.:.'r su lnng a� 'he \\·as oursidc the SCCtH1d s t�ltt', 
we stil l  d1 ) !1(H h tl\'�o:; ({ lnscnt l t l  iunsdiction in the �an1c : .. , ,n () t- w.l:· we .�t: r  in i n rcrnatiDnal Cdurr�. 
To �:::...: rhis \\'C n�..�t:d only f1flte th:H if  the pcc·,qn i n  yucsric"H'l c�1mc in t(J tb .. : second state for :tn�; 
rt.." .l�un ;H ;ill rhc court� in th�1t ':'t:trc \Vintld L::\('rci!'c iuri;-\diction. Th.H juri-;f.licti()i1 !T1(1Y h:;sc .'i 
tcrri rorla! hn1ir, :'lnd rh:·tt D!k' ctn aV(l\<..1 iurisdiction b:· sr.l:·ing our;-;ide th:.-:t l i n1it,  dc..,�s t1f >t rnean 
t hJt thL· j u ri sdiction is cunscnsual, nnly that it Ius l irn i ,; in other \\':1\'S. (lr should be admincd, 
howc:,,cr. th:lt such �xcrcisc' of junsdrctinn lll:tl· be contru,, ns ia l . )  
\\'c might t.hink nf rhis  o n  the ground,; nf a Rawbr:tn lwpnrhcric:d cuntract :1ppn •:1ch or sum" snn. 
ut. ut i l iuri :H1 Jppm:rch, I wiil nnr \\'orry :1bout this hcrv. 
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treatY d i d  ground j u ri sd iction,  despite N icaragua not  having i n vo ked any spec i fic 
clauses o f  th e treaty as having been violated.('5 Wh i l e this is perh aps not a n  
u n reasonable way t o  understand t h e  si tuation , i t  i s ,  t o  m y  mind, certaml y not �l 
requ i red read i ng. \'\'c do not h ere need to address whether thi s  was the proper 
rul i ng or n ot , b u t  we do sec that, even in cases where there i s  c lear exp ress 
consent to the j u ri sd ic ti on o f  the court for some d i s putes, there may be 
d i sagree men t as to whether the d i spute in  questi o n is  one for which consent  h a s  
b e e n  given. 
The second \vay for the ICJ to gain jurisdiction is more interes ting. The s u ­
ca lled "optional" clause gives the ICJ "compulsory" j u risdiction over any d.i sp u te 
re lati ng ro "the interpretation of a treaty; any questi o n  of i n te rnatio nal l a\.v; the 
existence of any fac t  which,  if establ i sh ed, \vmdcl consti tu te : 1  breach of an 
mternational obligation; the natu re or exte n t  of the reparation ro be made for the 
b reach of an i nternat i o na l obligatio'1."1"' I mporta nt ly, th i s compul sory 
j urisd i ctio n  applies only between s ta tes "accept i ng the �ame obligation.,,.- That  
is,  th ere i s  reciproci ty o f  obligation bu i l t i n  to the stature . There a re a n u mber o f  
lJUCSt ions about t h i s  compulsory j uri sd i ction that ,  I h o l d ,  a Loc kean ap proac h 
can s h ed l ight on, help us in understand i ng, and gi,·e u s  guidance as t( ) how we 
shou ld applv rhe  rules . J \Vi ll start fi rst with the question of why \Ve s h ou ld 
requ ire the "reciprocity" clause and \vh a t  i t  s hould he taken to mean. 
\\.hen states accept the op tiona l clause, the\ · arc: :1greeing tu lim i t  t he ir  
heha\· iur  1 11 ce rta i n \Vays hy gn·ing up the ir  pri\·;ne righ t u f  j udgmen t  i n  p:trticuhr 
d i s pu tes and agree i ng to subm it i n  such disputes to the judgm e n t  of  r h e  ! CJ.  
Such :111 .1greemcnt has  certain oh,·ious  s i m i la r i t ies  tu rltc types o f  agrecmenrs 
that , on Locke's ;\Ccounr,  rem( >\·e partie s from the sutc o f naru rc .  \\\: can 
assume t h at thc p:trties to such :tgrecments arc t ncl i\·idua l ly  ration a l .' '' Th t s i s  ru 
s:ty, the parties seek to impnn'C t heu O\vn soc i :d s i rwnion, understood in  rcnns 
ldm:, r!h:!!r)'. l ' lS·l I (J Rl'l' \'l2, 4·W- 4 l  (:\m· 2(>, l 'Ji:\·1; < >n J u n sdictrnn Jrl < l  
.\dnl J :-.sibiliry·�i; !nlrntdtionu-/ (fwr! ry.J:utit·l', Surnnl;try I �}H��/.S :  SunHiun· n f  rhc JudgnJt:nt { If 2\ )  
:\o\Tlnhcr l 9K·I .  LC). online :u /\\'"\\'.\' 6-+6-.pdf r\· i s i r..:-�..i ( )cr 
22. 2\ l l  
Stature u t- the l n r c rnatJnn:1! C:c>un uf  J u�tice, :\ rt�: _)(,(2)Cl)---(d) (_cncd i n  nntc 9) . I pur 
··cornpuhur�·" in  o;c:tre--quotcs ht:re to :lckno\\·!cdgt:: tht: nude })\ �t:bcn Jnd t n hcr�. dut. 
giYt.Tl the :1bil .ir�: n)  rruk(' n:.:scn·aticH1S, s1 ) · c:1!led "<:nrnpuh( ;r;.· )un�dicu, ln" r·�tlls s iHJn of 1Xh:H Wt' 
..:xp('CL .\:- ! \\ · : l l  rn.1ke dear. l do nf)r r"ui Jy agn.�c \\' i th J,c !::.cn t h .1t f h ...: : 1b!liry ro n1.tkc ·;uch 
rcscn·atiuns should he lhought to lean.: the declarations { 1t" �uch �t:Hc:- \\·i rhuu t ":1!rno�r �n 
practicd Y:llut.· . "  St:C l'(dscn, o/ ln!t'nwtion#i i .lilJ � H  ;q�: n (.Jb (etc�__! in  r\(lft: i 4) . in \\· lu r  
foliO\\';-. l :'lull k:n e the  sc.uc-yuotcs 1 1ff � 'if unlt:-- "- ir t·c n �� 1n1c rc.1�un s  (;:'}pccu! !\· 
necdt·tL 
682 
of safety and material well-being. \Ve second ly assume that the p arties h ave 
equal moral freedom.(") That i s ,  no p arty is natura.lly subject to ano ther, each 
party's i n terests count, and no party has natural poli tical  ob l igati ons to an oth er . 7 ' '  
Given these condi tio ns , part ies will e nter into an agreeme nt that b inds them only  
if, by e ntering th is agreement,  th ey expect to be made better o ff than th ey \vould 
be wi t hout i t .  That is ,  parties wil l  enter into an agreemen t to accept a common 
j udge onl y i f  they wi l l be b e tter off wi t h  such an agreement  than they would be 
in the state of nature. 
II O\vcver, to open one's sel f up to the j u ri sdiction of the court without 
o th ers accep ti ng the same juri sd iction \vould be to make one worse o ff than one 
\vould be \\·i thour the court. Given this , s o m e  s o n  of reciprocity requiremen t  is  
necessary for i t to be r<ltional  for parties in  a Lockean state of natu re to a,t,rree to 
the j unsdiction o f  the court . \Vithout  t h is,  i t  would be irra tional for the parties to 
give the ir  consent, s ince they could not  expect the ir  i nterest ro be prutccted, and 
so thev would never leave the stare o f  nature. 
The most basic type of a reciprocity requ i remen t  would he to req u ire s ta tes 
to either accept the optional clause without reservation or not to accept it at a l l .  
This  \\ ould ensure ec1ual ity of obligat ions among parties a n d  \\·ould l i m i t  
in terp re ti \-c difficulty. But, there i s  reason to reject th is so l u tion.  \\ e sec th is  
\\·hen we nore that  some s tates, perhaps a s igni ficant number, i f  given onh- the  
chnice of  accepting the optional clause wi thout reservation o r  re jecti ng i t  a l l  
together, \vi l l  reject i t, even though these states wou ld , by their O\vn ca lcu l a tion , 
be better o ff i f  they could accept the op tiona l c lause wi t h  some reservations .  
\'\'huber to  al low such reservations is t h e  next importan t c1uest ion . H e re \\T s ec 
a rule h( ) th fur rationa l i ty and mor;:tl equal i ty. 
The t e x t  of ,\rticle .36 sect ion 2 says nothing o nt�  \\·av or :tno ther about 
; d lowing rescn·;i tions .  But,  the clause has been rud :; o  a �  to ;ll io\v fur 
rc·snYa ti u n s  w i th the  requirement t hat, a s  per rhc recipn >ei t\- n:qu t rcmem, rhe 
St·c id : t r  l ;.'--)-+. \\'c tn:ty \\·onder if �t:ltcs, the "panic:-;" ar  i:'.�ue h�.,·rc. c:1n h:tYc "n1 t )r.1l frt.:'Cth >rH . . 
. tt ai l .  l �-!l..';rl.:t.: ch :'l! ..:.utcs :JJ Ju;); di' J nt 1t h :t\·e · · rnur:tl frtctb 1111" hut  th ink t:h;n \n._. C i ! !  hcrl� c( )rL�ttkr 
rhcrn :t:-; pn �xics !-Dr rhe n1t�ra! frccdorn nt- rhclr cirizens, keeping 1!1 rn :nd rh ..:.? rnin inu1 
)n n ...TJu i n.:·n1crn discuss�d :thu\'C. I f  cunscnt i::' ru hl· il'gi tinL- H in_t:: 1 r1 rhe \\';t�: di ;;t� u � s�:d 
her-:.:. we .tb( i rnu�r �cccpt �on1c degree r)[ Ct}ual i t �· an1ung sLHc->. such th.tt L'".H:h i� ;dkl\\ t·d { ! ) nuke. 
i t:-: ( •'.\T1 cb ! l ( t.'  � 1 ;;  tu whet" her to consen t  in  rht: relevant cases ur n n r .  
'fh : �  n 1 u ·, r  be in f\\"0 \V�lys. F:irsl, n1octl ohJi,t.!;H)nns c :..: i ;-; r  lx:t\\'l:t.·n :>Ute� c\ en \\-hen 
l1nl i t it:.d ( obligations do nnt. l r  is �r le:1st arguable th:H th("Sl.' rnoral t ,b] ig:ittplb. !n ::>r Hnc 
circun1sUnccs, include :H1 t� -; enter i nto ccrra;n 
"rur.u r:;l dury rd-· ju�ricc" exist� hcr-xeen :-; u res dut rn.pl!rcs 1 ht'n1 11 '  dc\·clop .tn uncrnat. i �  nu! 
_q-�rcn1. See Buch:H1:tn. I -(f!.J/i;;�JtJty, .:n•tl . �>i,t)):/:'!'!/.t.!Jjd/'!'!l/ J f  .:_!1f1 L _ _ iJ!) (L·i�t·._ J !n 111  )fC ·+). I :HJJ 
rt· , rhis  chin), but \Vou1d give i t  ;nuch n1nr(' n:lrro\V :--:,c� Jpc, tu ! nsutu t  ion..;, 
� L�:: thng wnh rhe enforccrncnt of ,/HJ (t�i!/!l.f nnrn1s ;lncL perhaps, ll1Jnurnnn �uh;;i">l 'cnct.: ri.�ht:-< ·rh i s  
let Y e s  the  �ifl'J 1 ,f intercq in this p:·tpcr r>pcn. 
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reservation m u s t  be reci procally effective. That is, i f  S tate i\ has a resen·ation i n  
i ts optional clause declaration, any s tate X that f\ brings a suit  against c a n  i nvoke 
the reservation in i\ 's declaratio n  for its (X's) own defensc.71 Th i s  ru l e  respects 
both ec1ualiry and rationality. \\ie can see that the rule respects equa l i ty since i t  
k eeps powerful n atio ns from giving themselves a better deal.  \Vi thou t t h e  
reciproci ty rec1uircment here, there would be a strong temptation fo r  powerfu l 
nations to impose an exceptionless  optional clause o n  weaker nations ,  \vh i le 
tak i ng rlejf.tcto excep tion s for themselves. This would h ave the effect o f  s add l i ng 
'.veaker nations with obLigations not respected by the strong. Reciprocity, then , 
helps preserve ecl ua lity. 
The reciprocity rec1uiremen t also respects ration ality, since it al lows for 
Pa rero imp rovem en ts over the state o f  nature that  would otherwise not be 
poss i b l e . The court, we might assume, is more usefu l  to the partie� with m ore 
rather th an with fewer states as members. But, son1e states will not jo in  if they 
can not make certa in rese rvations.  I f  the s tates that  arc alrcadv members al low 
the prospective member P to join with a rcserv;1tion, but do not have the o pt ion 
to take such a rese rvation themselves,  they mav be m ade \\·orse o ff than i f  the\· 
had kept P out.  Bur, i f  they a l low P to join with the rescn·at ion,  wh i l e h a\·i ng 
recourse t< l th e same res e r:ati on themselves, all will be better off than under th e 
ocher opt ions . Therefore, the reciprocity requirement al lmvs for a P:lreto 
i m pnwement over the s i tuation where such a clause is not :n aibblc. The poi n t  
o f  t h i s  argument i s  n o t  to make t h e  sort o f  c l ai m that  migh t be fo u n d  i n  a 
ln·pothetical  consen t  argument-that reservations s h o u l d  be :ll lm\·ed because 
rhev wou l d  be desired in a Loc kca n  s tate o f n a ture---but  rather tn s h m\· t h a t  
a l l owi ng rese rvat ions h el p s  make consent rational and reas() n< th lc , :tnd there fore 
can increase rhe lcgitirnacy of international courts. 
B .  Q ue s t i o n s  o f  C o m p e t e n c e  
The n e :-.: t q ue s tion is,  who h a s  the competen ce ro decide i f  the coun fus 
ju r i s d i ct ion) 'fhis is i m po rtant  both for a ns\vering tjucs ti on s ;d)ou t  re scn·auons, 
and for rnore general ques tions about competence. As a n  abscract i m1 u i n·, 
se\'e ra l :ms\vers arc possible.  Kclscn, for exam p l e, claims th at rhere is ;l p ri n c i p l e  
such that, "he \vho h as to apply a legal norm is  com peten t to i nterpret the norm, 
jsol each co n tracti ng party i s  competen t to in terpre t the treat\  . . .  msut�tr as dur 
partY Ius to appl y  the treaty by executing the dec is ions  of the tri b u nal. ' ' � " 
Add i tional lv,  "the tribunal , roo, is competent to i n t e rp ret t h e  rrcan . . .  s ince i t  
Thi� Is :-urr� )rrcd hy the Vienna Conventi()f1 un the I .:1.\\' c , t  Tt"l..:�luc� ; 
:_l I !  I ) fb), 1 1  :'i5 UN ·rn::m Scr .1 ) 1 .  reprinted in 8 I L,\1  67') (l %9). 
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has to apply· the treatv by making the decision of  the tribu naL " ' J Thi s  impbcs 
that, absen t an express agreement staring otherwise, a l l  parties, including the 
court, ha\'c th e abil i tv to decide if the court has competence to h ear a particu lar 
case. This shows, Kel sen says, that i n  such a case the execution of a decision 
depends on the good w i Ll  o f  the parties. ' 1  
B ut rh i s  cannot b e  quit e  right .  Rather, in  such a case w e  have not in  fac t  
estahlished a common judge, s ince each of the d isputing p arties has a right, and 
not just the abilit\', to set aside a decis ion or  to refuse to appear at alL In such a 
case we haYc not \'et left the s tate of nature and so h a\·e not establ i shed anv ' . 
po li t ica l ob l iga tions (since w be i n  the s tate of nature w it h  regard to someone i s  
to no t hav<: poli tical obliga tions to them). B u r, i f  there a re no poli tical 
obl igations betwee n the parties,  there cannot be l egal obl igations. Th ere m ay 
wel l  be mora l  obligations for parties to perform (ob l igations playing much the 
s a m e  role a s  l .ockc's "I  .aws of N a tu re") ,  but these are pre-political and so pre ­
legaLe' I n  suc h a case t h e  cou rt does n o t  merely depend o n  t h e  goodwil l  of the 
parties f o r  i ts effecrin:ness (to some degree , all i n terna tiona l  courts, e\·en ones 
n •  > t  set up in  rh is  way, re ly  on the go(Jdwill of the parties for  their e ffec ti\·cness,  
s ince they usua l l y  have f1( ) independen t e n forcement ab i l i ty) ,  but rather, in su ch a 
c<s c  we have fai led to form a cou rt i n  anv serious sense at �tiL  
This dues not, o f  course, mean t h a t  any particular co u rt m u s t  h a v <:  the 
c u mpc re n ce tu decide Its mvn com pe tence , at least as a fina l matter. Such 
<.jUesuuns migh t be l eft to h igher courts  or  to other bodies. Whether the l CJ has 
J U r i sd i ction 1n ;l  certat n  case, for exampl e, cou ld be decided by ma j ori ty nne in 
the t'N Gener:t l  . \ sscmhly. \\ har  is important, though , i f we a rc to h ave a court 
at a l l , i s  that someone ' > ther t h a n  the parties be fore the court must ha\'C the final 
'<ty as tn w h e th e r  the court has j u risd iction or otherwise has competence to hear 
the o�c  i n  ljuc�tinn. I f  rh i�  is no t  the ca�e, \\·c have nut  l e ft the s tate of nature. 
! ! ere we m ig h t  worry, though, that we arc j us t  undermini ng our ear l ier 
c laJm that  the  con;;cnt o f  the panics to the j urisdicti()n o f  t h e  court \Va� ,, 
n e c c � s :l n· clement for thL· lcg:i tim:tc\· of the c o u rt. Docs not gi\· ing a court the 
power t u  decide J ts  own competence and J U ri sd iction .L,rive i t  the power to h aul 
! d .  
ld .  
: -. (  nnt"\\- ! :Jt  llll Jfl' C(> t) t ff )\-cr:-.ul dun t11\ h ;d . .J '- Ll tcn:cnt t J t. l t  her�..: .._,., lu ld 
s.cetT1S r (  1 think rh .u ' l :He� arc ltJ!JI�/)· hnund hy cu :" t �  lt1Llr': 
:ntt.T!Ulion:..d h\\' c·\· cn :U):-:�:...·rn . tny tr:tditi :_ )n t ;r� tht: i');lrt uf :t partKubr Statt: in tTCngnizing rbi� 
C U >> t t H11, 1 n  rhc .lh�cncc 1 1 f  :my agrccn"'lcnr :1ccepring rhc cus rorn :1s l.tw. :1nd ahscnr ;�nv bndr \'.:H h  
dw n � h t  t :  � .Hl ] ud icli t.' n:bring tf J  tht: rn:ntc.?r. Cnn�1der 1d a t  �ttl(r- 1 9  (cncd in note l .f J .  I 
n 1 u :-a  .1.d rn : r  �h�11 I find hi:-. dt:.;cussion uncnn1n1nnly d.uk .tnd unt:ntn- i n(iri.g. F1 lf u:-(·ful discussJ( ,n 
1 Hl rc!.l tcd pi > tn!� . ...  cc �i.!t:ncr.tl!y HLtdlcy :tnd ( ; ubti, /n!r'rtla!iot�r;/ CJt.ilum ( clrcd 1n 
note 
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non - consent ing bodies before i t?  \'(/hile i t  is  true that the approac h  will give the 
court the pmvcr ro h ear cases relating to parties who do not wish tO be i n  front  
of the court i n  th i s  particular i n s ta nce, this is not the  sort of  consent that  i s  
important for legi timacy on a Lockean account. Recall that  Locke h eld that 
express consent, once given, could not be revoked.76 Even if \Ve do not follow 
Locke this far (as I think we should not) ,  we can see that consen t in the relc\·anr 
sense is not violated here. Once consent to the jurisdiction of the court is given, 
the court m ust h ave the ability to decide if this is  a n  instance of the sort \vhere 
consen t app lies, or else i t  will  not be able to perform the role for which i t  was 
set up by the parties . This \Vas kno\vn by the p arties before they established the 
court, and so a party who does not wish to be i n  court on a parrjnJar ins tance 
cannot refuse to recognize the competence of the court to decide these issues. 
How such rules \Vork in relation to a right to \Vi thdra\v consent will be discussed 
below. 
C .  T h e  R o l e  o F  R e s e r v a ti o n s  
Next, we must  look a t  h ow reservations in a st:ne's d eclara tion to the 
op tional clause should re late to the court 's ab il ity to decide i ts j u risdiction.  To 
some degree this issue is dealt \Vith by the reciproci ty clause. \\/hat we \van t  to 
avo id here is giving one s tate an u n fair advantage by le tti ng i t  avoid j urisdiction 
\vhcn i t is a defendant before the court, but asserti ng j u risdiction when it b rings 
a sui t . r\s noted, the e tlec t o f  reservations and the rec i proc i ty clause wil l  be to 
greatly ] jmit  the consent to j urisdiction of many countries . This i s  undesirable 
from a "glob:11 ' '  perspective, since the s ituation �•s a whole wou ld be better if all 
(or at least more) coun tries would jo in without reservation.  Bur, from the 
perspecti\·e of legitimacy, so long a s  reciprocity i s  respected , such reservations 
do not raise a serious barrier, s ince no s ta te wi l l be given an un fai r ach·an tage. To 
make sure rhat  we m ai n ta i n  l egi timacy \vhile havi ng the most effecti v e  court 
possib le, the court should make use o f  the fo l lO\ving rule i n  i n terpreti ng the 
reservations i n  a s ta te's declaration .  
\'Vhen a s tate X, who is a defendant i n  a case brough t by Y, invo kes a 
reservat ion found in Y's declaration, the cou rt s hould give a b road reading to 
this reservation, accepting the exception if i t  is at all plausible to do so. B ut, i f  X, 
as pan of its defense against a claim brought by Y, i nvokes a resen·:niun in  i ts 
own (that is, in X 's) dcclaution, the court s hould give this  a s tric t or narrow 
interp retation, and not accept the exception to j urisdic tion u nless it is  c learly and 
obvious ly requ ired by the reservatio n .  
Sec Sl·ctiun l l .  
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Such a ru le wil l have several desirable results .  First, i t  wi l l  help ensure t h at a 
state can not make use of its own reservations to gai n  unf�tir adva n tages over 
other s tates, s 1nce i ts  reservati o n s  will be read more strict ly when i t  i nvokes them 
on i rs own behalf. Second, such a rule will  give the court as  b road a j urisdicti o n  
a s  poss ib le while s till respecting the con cE tions needed to assure legit i macy via  
consent. Final ly,  t h l s  approach wi ll encourage s tates to l i mi t  their usc of 
reservation s ,  s i nce such a rule  p u ts serious limits  on th e  number o f  cases where a 
reserTation \viii be to a s tate's advantage, whi le  respec ti ng a s ta te's abi l i ty to 
decide ·when s uc h  a reservatio n is  ulti mately needed. This rule e n sure s  cha t  no 
u n fai r ach-antage can be gai n ed b y  taking reservations, and as such encourages 
s tates ro take reservations o n l y  when they t h i n k  they are abso lute l y  necessary for 
their self- i n te rest. This  promotes expanded j u ri sd i c tion of the court (which i s  
des i rab le fro m t h e  global perspective) whi l e  m ai ntai ning the Loc kean l imits o n  
consent. 
D .  \\ i t h d r a w i n g  C o n s e n t  
The n e x t  c1 uesrion o f  i nteres t to u s  i s  whether (an d  i f  so, \vh e n) a party 
s hou ld be :-tble to withclra\v consen t  to j urisd icti o n .  As noted several ti mes, 
l ,ocke held that express con sen t, once given, could not  b e  \Vithd ra\vn.c7 B u t, as 
a l so noted ab<J\T, there i s  no reason due to the very logic o f  consent, or to 
Locke's argument tlut legi timacv is grounded o n  consent, to hold that consent 
c a n  11lTer be withd r:nvn. But, there must  be some lower bound on the abilirv to 
withd raw consent .  [ f <l pa rrv can withdraw consent a t  any time, then we h ave nor 
n:t left t h e  s ta te  o f  nature, as no one w i l l  need to be bound \Vhc n  i t  is 
incom,enicnt ,  [ t  seems, then, that  one has to look :t t part icular  details o f  th e 
:t\.!:rccmenr i n  question to sec ,,·hat sorts o f  l im i ts o n  ,,· i rhdrawing consent arc 
rL':lso nable for that  n·pe of agreemen t .
·
,, 
I n  a s i tuat ion Like that considered h e re-consent to the j urisd iction , ) f  t h e  
[ (:_1 --rhc abi l i ty tn \\·nhdraw consen t  by a s tare i s  im rortan t for two reasons.  
Fi rst, ch anged cond i t i ons nL1\' make an agreement that was ra tional at one ti me 
i rra tional ar Ll tcr t imes. But, if  con sen t  cannot be wi thdrawn, s tates ei ther  w i l l  
n •  l t  j o i n  at al l (s i nce doing S t >  when t h e y  expect th ey might w a n t  t o  \Vi thcl raw 
later would be i rrat iunal)  or e lse wou ld refuse to comph· wi th the court w h e n  
\-;  nnrcd :lho\·e. in  t h i s  p:tpcr l focus ( )n treaty !:Jw (and in parncul:tr n n  con:-.cnt r o  rhc 
j u rbd:cnnn ( ,f in rcn1;ltlt :na! cnurt�)- �!'he quc:;;:-:inn nf \\·hcrh(.'r :t :-·. tare rTuy -.Yi rhdra\\' fn}nl 
C\l "- ff H!urv intenutif l!Ltl Ltv· �H :dl is :1 rnun.:· cuntrcn·ersial une� :tnd :hH 1 111;.' th::t t  J c1n d i :::c u s :::. i n  
rh l '  p.1pcr I l< lWt:'>Tr, ! a m  C< lllYi nccd by rhc JCcount )..'1\·en by Bradk\· and Gulari in rherr 
ruper, ln!tn:a!iona/ CJtJIO!!Jt that a gcncr.11 prc)hibition nn \\·irhdr:nv·i ng 
fn Hn Cll;\fnn);'!.f}" inrcnution�tl Li\\" h neither pbusihle nor des!Lthlc .  Hradk�· and c ; uLn _i �  
! l ' il/:dr:n;i;�� ,tiNJ.' ]l!.'en!ii!iulhl/ (.-:u!Olli . t t  . .  )-l---()2 (cited i n  nut(: 2) . 
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faced with negati \'e decis ions.  Both o f  these options \vcmld weaken the court 
and give us pragmatic reasons to allow for withdrawal of consent at least in 
certa in  s i tuations. I shal l  consider those situations below. 
More i mportantly, from a Lockean perspective, not  allowing \Vithdrawa] 
under any circumstances would .�:,rready lessen the legitimacy of the court, 
because o f  a particular e ffect of consent peculiar to consent given by a 
governme n t. Governments represent diffe rent people over time. I f  a 
government consented to the j u risdiction o f  the court in the 1 950s, the great 
maiority of  those who voted for this, and even many who were alive then, arc 
now d ead. I f  consent  cannot be revoked u nder any condition, after some time all  
c i ti zens o f  a state \Vi i i  be l iv ing under a n  obligation that they did not consent to 
and which they cannot change. lf one is ruled by the "dead hand of the past," 
one is not self- ruli ng, and so one is not free in the way that the Lockean consent 
theory was meant to protect. Since the role of governments is to protect the 
righ ts o f  their  cit i7.ens,7'' and s t�ltes h ave righ ts only  insofar as \ve think that 
having states is necessary to protecting the  citizens of those s tates,"(' i t  seems that 
the consent of states must be al lmved to change in a way so as to protect the 
rights of the citi;�.ens.  But, since the citizens and the government of a s ta re 
change O\Tr time, they must have the ability to revoke consent given in the 
K l  past.  
\'1/e can sec this c\·en more clearly in the case o f  countries that were, at the 
time of their ascens ion to the treaty i n  question, not democratic. To not al low 
such countries, when th ey ha\·c undergone a transition ro a democracy, to 
withdraw consent (C\Tn \Vi t h  certain l i mitations d i scussed belmv),  \VCJLdd be tu 
render consL'nt  me:m inglcss as a legitim a ting tool .  !\ !though the case is c learer 
for countries in transition from dictatorship to democracy, the probletTl is 
essential ly the same in e ither case.  So, i f  consent by a s tate is to be l egi ti ma ti ng, i t 
must be possi b le to withdraw, at least \vi th in  certain boundarics.'2 
Buchanan �trgues for  S(Hnet hl n.�� l ike th is  \virb hjs notion nf "rcc� ;gnitlun�d Jcgiti1n:1cy. ' '  See 
Buchanan. wid \'c;/ Oc!i'rmination at 2(,(r-615 (cited in note 4). l do not :l).!:rt:<: with 
;J]J of Buch anan\ accu unr. but tine! i t  Jn!'tTucrivc. 
�cc. t�H- ex:1111p!e, 1).1\·id J acuh�t H1, R.(�h/J /IOVJJ Horda:r: r'H/ll�t!,rllfioJI ,;nd !hr f)tdinr 1 1 2 
Qohns H opkins I 9%); :'l l ich:1d lgnarieff, I lnma11 ICIJ.�bt.r ,u l'ofilirr rmd ldoiatry 23 (Pnncc·ron 2110 1 ) .  
\Unwinf?_ :.:r:nc" rn w i t hdLl\\. n �n�C"!H� contin�ent o n  facrors I c.Ji�cu:ss bcin\\-·, sccrns t o  n1e ro 
sut'ficic:ndy :mswer mam· "f r h c  worries ra.iscd by Gokbrnirh and Posner about cnnsenr rmpusing 
ubl.ig:ltions nn pCt)pk· \\·ho v:crL· not aliv e  at the tirnc cons�nr w:ts gi\Tn. Sec (;i)ld�rnith :u1d 
Posner. Tbt' L/JN//1 L.:111' at 1 9 1 -92 (cited i n  note 5) . 
This k:l\·es open rhc <jUesrion :1s ro whether cnnscnr to membersh i p  m ;l stare. ,t:;in:n bv an 
indJ\'ldual. shnuld he i rrc\ C>GJble. as l .ockc thought, since c:;scnrial f:lcts ahour rhe "i-,"ecmcnr are 
d1tferenr. I do nor ti nd l .ockc', :1rgumcnt hcre, so far :1s he has nne, persuasive, bur this issue is :u 
hcst tangential to rhc tnp:c m th Js  paper :md so will be 1gnorcd. For cbscw:sinn nn t h i s  puinr. sec 
688 [ 'o! I I  ;'\o. 2 
So, \\·hat bou ndaries shou l d be p laced on vvithclr<l\val frorn consent 1r1 a 
case !ike the o ne at i ssue here ?  A Loc kean (or any philosophical) approach 
unnot giv e  �l full\· de termi nate a n swer as to w h ar l imits should be p l aced on the 
right  to withdmw here, s ince t his wil l depend o n  var ious empirical 
cons iderations and wi l l thus require v\·ork by po l iti cal scientists and other non­
p hi losophers. But, \Ve can derive some gene ra l gu idelines from a Lockean 
approach . 
The first p ri ncipl e  we can der1\·e i s  that a country m u s t  not be abl e to usc 
th e righ t to with draw in order to be the judge in  its own case, si nce if this were 
possible,  there vvou!d be no e ffectjve \vi tbdrawal fro m t h e  s ta te of nature. 
Second, tbe righ t  to w i thd ravv consent can not be al lowed i n  a \\·ay t h :lt  gi,·es an 
u n fair ach·antage to one state when another has relied on the consent o f  the firs t 
in a way that th e reciproci ty condi tion cannot remedy. This condit ion s trongly 
impl ies that immediate wi t hdrawal should not  be allowed, since in many cases 
one state will baYc  done someth ing rha r  wou ld gi ve rise to a CJ use of action by 
another state, but the second state will not yet have had time to bring a case to 
the lCJ ! f  immediate withdrawal (or the immediate in troduction of a new 
rcserv�uion) were allowed, then the offending s ta te could, as soon as i t  k n nv a 
else \H)ldJ soon be brougbr, withdraw from rhc court or assert a !lC\V 
rescrYation, thereby c i rcum\·cnting j ustic e and u n fai r ly bu rden i ng the first 
co untrT. 
\\ 'e can gai n a more cuncretc ,- iew uf this issue b�- l oo kin g �H three rc:latecl 
issues in the Nicaragua c1se: first, the  a ttempt b\· rhc LS to c hange i ts  
rcst:rY:uiun u n i latera l ly ,  \\· i rh  im mediate e ffect ; :;ecund, the ch1 i m  by t h e  L iS t h a t  
s ince � ica ragua bad nu express w it hd rJ\\·a l  c b u s e ,  it  (N icar:1gua) cou ld \\·i thd ra\v 
immcdi:\ teh-, and thus the LiS should h a\·e t he upr.ion to \\· i thd ra\\· i m m c d i :neh' 
: t s  \\·d l :  ·.wd fin J.ll y , the proper \\·a,· to unders tand \\· i rhdrawal cla u�cs l ike  rhc 
L;S\ ::;ix-mon th nutice clause. 
I s tart first  with the L S's  attempt t( ) change its reser\'at ion \\· i th i m mediate 
effect. The court i n the N icaragua case rejected this ,  �1nd was righ t to do so, 
s i nce �1llowing such a change would h :l\T al l owed the  US to commit a \\·rong :1.nd 
then re fuse to accept j ur isd ic tion (to \\·hich i t  h :1d appare ntly prt.�\· iousk 
assentcd) ." 1 \'Chile  we onnot gi\·e a hard ru le :l.S tu \\·h a t  sort o t. ti me period i s  
needed in a case l ike.: th is, i r  is a t  least  c lc: 1r th:l t  \l·bcn a sr:1 tc im·okes a 
resen·a rion or \\·i thcl ra\\'al frurn cunscn t so as to a\·oid iur i � d i ct iun for :1 p:1s t  
\\Tong for which ; l  G l S C  ma�· be, b u t  has  not  n: t  been brough t bcfu re rhc cou rt, 
i .i :-- tt.:�r, (.'ili�;-_t'n.rf.·,·ji;. in /hr ] IJJJ!!(�ti":liori c·o·!!t."\1, -:'! ) \ld I .  R�..·v )() (c i ted tn llnrc :1S); CulH:ll, (.':117'(d j.i"fi.lll 
/hr !nJid( UJJ/ Jr 4fJ-�S (cited in n• He ·-l i J )  . 
.\"n ,;r.;�:;.: r I. · \ .  1 '!:-;-1 ICJ R F.I'  ;n ·H I ((J tc,l l n  note (•5} ;  J(J, .\111/Jl!l<ill f i)S.J 1 ) ;lt ': l ( l l:> {cited in 
nutc (-._:.) . 
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such a \vithdrawaJ cannot be a l lowed because i t  would  give an u n fair ach·<muge 
to the \Vithdra\ving party. 
The ICJ was also correct to reject the claim by the US that, because 
Nicaragua had no expl icit wi th drawal clause in its decla ration, it  \vas free to 
wi thdraw ;t t any tim e, and thus the U S  should be free to do the same." 1  Much of 
the same reasoning as abo,·e applies here . To allow immedi ate withdrawal '\vould 
be to allow for one party to have a n  unfair adnmtage-to com m i t a \vrong and 
then ro escape the juri sdiction of  the court. A llowing such withclrawa1 s  wou1c\ 
not be rational for the parties making such an agreem e n t  It  i s  more reaso nable  
to suggest that, where a state does not have an express wi thd ra\\·al c l ause, i t  i s  
bound by the rul e  i n  t h e  Vienna Convention o n  Treaties, giYing a d e fau l t  rul e  o f  
o ne -year's notice be fore w i t hdra\va l from a treaty i s  effecrivc.s' Th is \VOLt l d  a l low 
states to tailor more r1ex.ible withdrawal clauses i f  so needed (\vi thi n cc rt:-t in 
bounds) , but would make cleu that the default  ru le  is  that withd rawal may nut 
be e ffective immediate!\-. 
Finally, clauses allowing for withdrawal , such as the US's six-month notice 
ru le,  s hou ld be read so as to p rotect the i nterests of t he s tate not m a ki ng the 
motion to 'vi thdraw conse n t  Thi s  can best be done b�· requiri ng th at withclra\\·al 
\'.:ould  o n l y  be prospective-that  i s ,  a s ta te t h a t  has withdn1wn coment from the 
court wou ld st i l l  be li able for anv wrongs done before the e ffcc rin� d ate o f  i ts 
w i thdrawal, even if the claim against the state in question is brought after the 
effective date of withdrawal . This , roo, \vi ll be necessary tu keep sutes from 
usi ng withdra\va1 to take u n fair ach-anrage of other s tates. lr i s  also especi:tl l� ·  
necessary to protect poorer s tates from richer and more powerfu l  one�, s ince we 
may assume that i t  will take poor an d '\veak s tates longer ro be able  tn bring 
c laims before the lCJ than s tronger and wea.lthier ones. 
V I .  S u :-.\ \L\ K Y  1\ � D  C o N C UJ S ! O N  
ln the above discussion I have shown bow a Locke:m social contract 
approach can help explain the role o f, and tbe l imits  on, consent as  a l egi ti mati ng 
ekmcnt in in ternational law. Though I ha\·c focused on consent ro i nternati o n a l  
, _  
courts, particu larly the l CJ ,  I bcl ie\·e that t h e  general approach i :;  appli c:-�b lc  to 
much o f  international law, at l east when we avoid the twin errors o f  thj n k i ng 
thatjus C!{�t:ns norms make 1..1p all or the most importam part of inn:rnationai bw, 
and t ha t  i n te rnational  law forms J singl e "sysrcm" th:1t must be con�cnted to a l l  
rogether or not at alL Furthermore, I contend that Fol l owing t h e  model set  o u t  i n  
: P Id .  
·�·�· Vienna ConYcntion on the L�l\'-. of T rtaties . . '\rt S6(2) (c ited in  nore -; l ) .  
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I .is/,'1' 
this  article could help international courts, and international law more general\\' , 
be more lcgttimate,  and thereby better sen-e their rok. 
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